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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two chapters that explore how micro-level heterogeneity helps us understand the
dynamics of macroeconomic variables. Chapter 2 shows that the evolving likelihood of marriage and divorce
is an essential factor in accounting for the changes in housing decisions over time in the United States. I build
and estimate a life-cycle model of single and married households who face exogenous age-dependent marital
transition shocks and then conduct a decomposition analysis between 1970 and 1995. The results show that
household formation shocks could account for about 30% of the increase in the single's homeownership rate
and play a crucial role in generating the observed sign of change in portfolio share of married households. The
extended analysis on recent years after 1995 shows that the continuing decrease in marriage prospects
contributed to push up the single's homeownership rate during the housing boom in the mid 2000s. Chapter 3
develops a state-space model with a state-transition equation that takes the form of a functional vector
autoregression and stacks macroeconomic aggregates and a cross-sectional density. The measurement
equation captures the error in estimating log densities from repeated cross-sectional samples. The log densities
and the transition kernels in the law of motion of the states are approximated by sieves, which leads to a finite-
dimensional representation in terms of macroeconomic aggregates and sieve coefficents. We illustrate how the
model works based on the simulation of the Krusell-Smith economy and conduct an empirical analysis on the
joint dynamics of technology shocks, per capita GDP, employment rates, and the earnings distribution.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN HETEROGENEITY IN MACROECONOMICS
Minsu Chang
Jesu´s Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Frank Schorfheide
This dissertation consists of two chapters that explore how micro-level heterogeneity
helps us understand the dynamics of macroeconomic variables. Chapter 2 shows that
the evolving likelihood of marriage and divorce is an essential factor in accounting for
the changes in housing decisions over time in the United States. I build and estimate a
life-cycle model of single and married households who face exogenous age-dependent
marital transition shocks and then conduct a decomposition analysis between 1970 and
1995. The results show that household formation shocks could account for about 30% of
the increase in the single’s homeownership rate and play a crucial role in generating the
observed sign of change in portfolio share of married households. The extended analysis
on recent years after 1995 shows that the continuing decrease in marriage prospects
contributed to push up the single’s homeownership rate during the housing boom in the
mid 2000s. Chapter 3 develops a state-space model with a state-transition equation that
takes the form of a functional vector autoregression and stacks macroeconomic aggregates
and a cross-sectional density. The measurement equation captures the error in estimating
log densities from repeated cross-sectional samples. The log densities and the transition
kernels in the law of motion of the states are approximated by sieves, which leads to a finite-
dimensional representation in terms of macroeconomic aggregates and sieve coefficents.
We illustrate how the model works based on the simulation of the Krusell-Smith economy
and conduct an empirical analysis on the joint dynamics of technology shocks, per capita
GDP, employment rates, and the earnings distribution.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Modern advances in quantitative macroeconomics and econometrics have opened the door
for researchers to build and estimate models with hypotheses regarding inequality and het-
erogeneous agents in the economy. Representative agent models are not designed to study
the distributional phenomena, and the need for laboratories to study a macroeconomic
policy with distributional consequences has boosted the development of a wide array of
heterogeneous agent models. This is also fueled by the availability of rich micro-level
data on heterogeneous households, firms, countries, and so on. However, more research
is needed on how to link heterogeneous agent macroeconomic models to the micro data
in a statistically sound way. This dissertation consists of two chapters that explores how
micro-level heterogeneity helps us understand the dynamics of macroeconomic variables.
This ranges from estimating a life-cycle model of heterogeneous households to account
for aggregate housing demand to including both aggregate and cross-section data in
functional vector autoregressive models for their joint dynamics.
Chapter 2 shows that the evolving likelihood of marriage and divorce is an essential
factor in accounting for the changes in housing decisions over time in the United States.
To quantify the importance of this channel, I build a life-cycle model of single and married
1
households who face exogenous age-dependent marital transition shocks. I then estimate
the parameters of the model by a limited information Bayesian method to match the
moments from 1995’s cross-section data. I conduct a decomposition analysis between 1970
and 1995, two years with similar real house prices but substantially different probabilities
of marital transitions. I find that the change in the likelihood of marital transitions accounts
for 29% of the observed increase in the homeownership rate of singles. This portion is
substantial given that the changes in downpayment requirements, earnings risk, and
spousal labor productivity jointly replicate 45% of the change. When the change in marital
transitions is shut down, the marrieds’ housing asset share increases, which is opposite
to the data’s pattern. Then I extend my analysis to study whether the ongoing change
in marital transitions still plays a role in explaining housing decisions in recent years,
which have seen dramatically changing house prices. In addition to other factors such
as credit constraints, wages, and beliefs on price appreciation that are often suggested as
drivers for homeownership increase during the housing boom in the mid-2000s, I show
that the continuing decrease in marriage contributes to an approximately 7% increase in
the homeownership rate for young singles.
Chapter 3 develops a state-space model with a state-transition equation that takes
the form of a functional vector autoregression and stacks macroeconomic aggregates and
a cross-sectional density. The measurement equation captures the error in estimating
log densities from repeated cross-sectional samples. The log densities and the transition
kernels in the law of motion of the states are approximated by sieves, which leads to
a finite-dimensional representation in terms of macroeconomic aggregates and sieve
coefficents. We illustrate how the model works based on the simulation of the Krusell-
Smith economy. The results from historical decomposition and impulse responses are
shown to be consistent with the well-known statement that micro-level heterogeneity
does not play much role regarding aggregate dynamics in the Krusell-Smith economy. In
addition, we use this model to study the joint dynamics of technology shocks, per capita
2
GDP, employment rates, and the earnings distribution using the real-world data. We find
that the estimated spillovers between aggregate and distributional dynamics are generally
small, a positive technology shocks tends to increase the fraction of individuals earning
less than the labor share of per capita GDP, and shocks that raise the inequality of earnings
have ambiguous effects on per-capita GDP.
3
Chapter 2
A House Without a Ring: The Role of
Changing Marital Transitions for
Housing Decisions
Owner-occupied housing represents the largest asset of most households’ net worth.
Furthermore, it is often argued that owner-occupied housing is associated with desirable
policy goals such as better-maintained neighborhoods and better educational outcomes for
the children living in them. Thus, it is not a surprise that many countries have encouraged
home purchase by policies such as mortgage subsidies and tax benefits. This means
that, to assess the effectiveness of such policies, it is crucial to study which factors affect
households’ housing decisions. This paper argues that the evolving likelihood of marriage
and divorce is an essential factor in accounting for the change in homeownership rate and
composition of household net worth over time.
Figure 1 shows the likelihood of marital transitions, homeownership rate, and housing
asset share — net housing value divided by the total asset — in 1970 and in 1995. I pick
1970 as a representative period of high marriage and low divorce risks for two reasons:
4
first, it is not easy to get information on households’ portfolios with data prior to 1970;
second, a number of changes happened after 1970 in social norms associated with marriage
and divorce. One leading example is the legalization of no-fault divorce over the 1970s, in
which the dissolution of marriage does not require proof of wrongdoing by either spouse.1
As a period of low marriage and high divorce risks, I choose 1995 because real house prices
were similar in levels but the probabilities of marital transitions differed substantially
between 1970 and 1995. Once the analysis between 1970 and 1995 is done, changing house
prices will be incorporated to study recent years after 1995.
The top-left panel in Figure 1 shows marriage probabilities conditional on the age of
household head. Young singles in 1995 were much less likely to get married compared to
those in 1970. In the top-right panel, the singles’ homeownership rate displays a significant
increase from 1970 to 1995. I argue that this change in the homeownership rate can be
accounted for at least partially by the change in the likelihood of marriage. If a single
is likely to get married soon, he/she will wait to buy a house with a spouse because
transaction costs make it costly to sell or resize a house. Furthermore, the prospect of
marriage creates a free rider problem that discourages singles from saving, which makes it
less likely for them to be homeowners.
Divorce rates increased sharply over the 1970s as a marriage was no longer regarded
as mandatory. The bottom-left panel of Figure 1 shows that divorce probabilities increased
across all age groups from 1970 to 1995. The bottom-right panel shows the housing share in
total assets of married households. Compared to those in 1970, young married households
in 1995 held a lower fraction of total assets in housing. I show that this pattern can be
generated by the change in the likelihood of marital transitions. A married couple will
invest less in housing if the partners are more likely to get divorced, because it is more
difficult to split a house than liquid assets such as checking accounts.
1. California first enacted the no-fault divorce in 1969. By late 1983, all the states except for South Dakota
and New York had legally allowed no-fault divorce. It is still controversial whether this law raised divorce
rates (Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2006). Instead of taking a stand on causal effect, I interpret the legalization
of no-fault divorce as a signal of change in social norms about marriage and divorce.
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Marriage Probabilities Homeownership of the Single
Divorce Probabilities Housing Asset Share of the Married
Figure 1: Likelihood of Marital Transitions and Housing Decisions (1970 vs. 1995)
Note: Section 2.1 and Section 2.3 of this paper include details on how these figures are generated.
In summary, I hypothesize that the change in housing decisions is affected by the
change in the likelihood of marital transitions in a quantitatively important way. Similar to
Cubeddu and Rı´os-Rull (2003) and Ferna´ndez and Wong (2014), I study this hypothesis by
taking marriage and divorce as exogenous shocks households face. This is in a similar vein
to the previous literature treating employment status or earnings as exogenous shocks that
shape households’ decisions. Then I vary the underlying probabilities over time to reflect
the observed changes in household formation from the data.
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To quantify the effect of the change in marital transitions on the change in homeowner-
ship and housing asset share, I build a life-cycle model of single and married households
that face age-dependent marital transition shocks. In other words, households consider
the prospect of marriage and divorce when making decisions. They decide how much to
consume, rent, save in non-housing and housing assets, and work. Owned housing incurs
substantial transaction cost whenever its size is adjusted. Especially in times of getting
married or divorced, this cost is modeled to arise because a status change makes the house
owned prior to the change no longer suitable. This is empirically supported by the fact
that, although some couples move in to the home that one partner already has, they tend
to sell the house and move to another one within 5 years of marriage, which is the unit of
my model period (Speare and Goldscheider, 1987). Likewise, divorcees are likely to move
to a new house since the house bought as a married couple would not meet their needs
after divorce (South et al., 1998).
In addition, I model the following features to reflect other changes that may have
affected housing decisions: (i) A finite number of housing sizes are available to own, each
of which can serve as a collateral for borrowing. This is useful to isolate the role of relaxed
borrowing constraints on lumpy housing decisions. (ii) Households face idiosyncratic
labor productivity shocks. This enables me to analyze how households adapt their housing
investment to increasing earnings risk. (iii) Each household member decides how much
to work. As a spouse’s labor productivity increases, the model generates the increase in
spousal labor supply while allowing for a household head to adjust his/her labor supply
accordingly.
I structurally estimate the parameters of the model by a limited information Bayesian
method to match the moments from the cross-section data of 1995, the benchmark year
for my analysis. The model closely fits the life-cycle profiles of homeownership, housing
asset share, and labor force participation across marital status observed in the data. The
estimated parameters inform us about the substitutability of renting and owning a house,
7
utility from home production, economies of scale within marriage, and cost associated
with labor supply. Then, I conduct a decomposition analysis to quantify how much of the
change in housing decisions between 1970 and 1995 can be accounted for by the change in
the likelihood of marital transitions. These two years are treated as steady states with the
same housing prices, but very different marriage and divorce prospects.
First, I find that the change in the likelihood of marital transitions accounts for 29% of
the observed change in singles’ average homeownership rate. This channel is useful to gen-
erate a homeownership rate of singles aged 25 to 30 that is much lower in 1970 compared
to 1995. I also incorporate other changes in key drivers of housing decisions studied in
the literature: borrowing constraints, earnings risk, and spousal labor productivity. When
combined, these channels account for 45% of the observed change. The comparison with
the marital transition channel, which accounts for 29% of the observed change, demon-
strates that the change in marital transitions is quantitatively of comparable importance to
the changes in borrowing constraints, earnings risk, and spousal productivity.
Second, in the data, the average share of assets held in housing by married households
declined by 11% between 1970 and 1995. The model can only reproduce this decline if
the changes in marital transitions are included. In their absence, the other drivers predict
an increase in this share, again demonstrating the crucial importance of this channel for
observed trends in households’ housing decisions. In addition to getting the consistent
sign of change as observed in the data, all the combined channels generate 31% of the
observed change in housing asset share of the married.
It is then an obvious question whether marital transitions, which have continued to
change, still play a role in explaining the evolution of housing variables in recent years
when house prices have changed dramatically. To incorporate the changing house prices,
I model the common house price as a stochastic shock similar to Corbae and Quintin
(2015), thereby replicating the house price boom-bust episode in the 2000s. I also include a
belief shock on appreciation to generate the surge in homeownership during the boom.
8
I simulate the homeownership rate with changing house prices, beliefs on appreciation,
credit constraints, and wages. These changes are set to mimic the recent experiences in the
housing market.
The reduction in marriage and divorce probabilities observed in the data increases the
singles’ homeownership rate by 6.8% whereas it decreases the marrieds’ homeownership
rate by 3.2% during the boom. The changes in credit constraints, wages, and beliefs on
appreciation were often suggested as drivers for homeownership increase during the
boom, which is also supported by my paper. It is worth noting that the change in marital
transitions contributes to replicate the homeownership increase for young singles even
when the house price was expensive. In contrast, the change in marital transitions puts
downward pressure on the marrieds’ homeownership, which is masked by the other
factors during the boom.
This paper contributes to several distinct strands of literature. First, it is related to the
literature on household portfolio choice with housing. An important stream of papers
analyzes the implication of housing as illiquid asset in theoretical models of portfoilo choice
(Grossman and Laroque, 1990; Flavin and Yamashita, 2002; Stokey, 2009). Most quantitative
papers on portfolio choice with housing rely on a life-cycle framework, motivated from
empirically conspicuous life-cycle patterns in housing decisions (Cocco, 2005; Yao and
Zhang, 2005; Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger, 2007; Kaplan and Violante, 2014). My
paper builds on these while modeling transaction cost that arises in times of marital
transitions. This captures the friction from the idiosyncratic nature of housing investment
in that a status change would make the house owned prior to the change unsuitable.
Second, this paper demonstrates the importance of change in idiosyncratic risk on
aggregate variables, which is also emphasized in the literature. For instance, idiosyncratic
income shocks are analyzed to affect various aggregate variables such as income and
consumption inequality (Blundell et al., 2008; Heathcote et al., 2010), output and associated
welfare (Low et al., 2010), and homeownership (Diaz and Luengo-Prado, 2008). My paper
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studies the aggregate implication of idiosyncratic shocks, including marital transition risk
and earnings risk, on homeownership and households’ portfolios over time. Furthermore, I
study how the change in marriage and divorce probabilities affects these housing variables
differently between singles and married households.
Third, this paper contributes to the literature that analyzes the importance of marital
transitions for households’ decisions. This includes various non-housing decisions such
as savings and female labor supply (Cubeddu and Rı´os-Rull, 2003; Mazzocco et al., 2007;
Ferna´ndez and Wong, 2014; Voena, 2015), fertility and child investment (Brown and Flinn,
2011), and portfoilo choice without housing (Love, 2010). Few recent papers attempt to
study housing decisions in the presence of marital transitions. Fisher and Gervais (2011),
for example, generate the decrease in the aggregate homeownership of the young by a
trend of marrying later and having more singles in the economy. However, as opposed to
my model, their framework cannot replicate the increase in young singles’ homeownership
rate observed in the data. Fischer and Khorunzhina (2018) study the role of divorce risk
on housing decisions by comparing the simulated life-cycle profiles for those with and
without divorce risk. I attempt to link my model to the historical data to quantify how
much of the change in the likelihood of marriage and divorce can account for the change
in housing decisions. To the best of my knowledge, my paper is the first study to quantify
this effect with estimation using the micro data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 describes the data and
establishes the empirical facts. Section 3.1 outlines the model, and Section 2.3 explains how
to calibrate and estimate the parameters and provides the model fit. Section 2.4 shows the
decomposition analysis, which quantifies how much of the change in housing decisions
can be accounted for by the change in the likelihood of marital transitions between 1970
and 1995. Section 2.5 extends the framework to incorporate the changing house prices to
study the recent periods. Section 3.5 concludes.
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2.1 Data
In this section, I illustrate the data sources used to construct the life-cycle profiles of
housing variables in 1970 and 1995. It is worth noting that the real house price was
quite stable between the two years.2 To control for this confounding factor, I chose 1970
and 1995 because the house prices were similar in level, but the likelihood of marital
transitions differed substantially. The year 1970 was chosen as a representative period
with high marriage and low divorce probabilities. If we look at the time series data3, the
marriage rate showed a local peak in 1970 and started to fall from then on. In contrast,
with the legalization of no-fault divorce, the divorce rate surged throughout the 1970s.4
The year 1995 was chosen as the benchmark period with high divorce and low marriage
probabilities. It is suitable for the analysis in that it is after the housing recession in 1990
and before the start of housing price boom in late 1990s, a trend that continued until the
Great Recession.
I cover different time periods in the separate sections. In Section 2.4, I conduct a
decomposition analysis between 1970 and 1995 to study how much of the change in
marital transition probabilities can explain the change in housing decisions, controlling for
the house price. However, the house price increased dramatically over the early 2000s. In
addition, the marital transition probabilities continued to change, although the magnitude
of change became small. In Section 2.5, I extend my analysis and study the implication of
marital transition probabilities on housing decisions under changing house prices.
2. See Corbae and Quintin (2015) for the time series of the real house price index. The price to rent ratio also
shows a similar trend as reported in Gallin (2008).
3. Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Center for Health Statistics (CDC NCHS)
4. See Voena (2015) for the overview of U.S. divorce laws and for the literature review.
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2.1.1 Data to construct life-cycle profiles in 1995
I use the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which is conducted every three years
and is available from the Federal Reserve’s website. This data is a repeated cross-section
that provides detailed information on the households’ portfolio choices as well as their
demographic characteristics such as age and marital status.
To be consistent with my model, I categorize assets into either housing or non-housing
assets.5 The SCF also provides information on mortgages and home equity lines of credit,
which can be used to construct the net value of housing assets. Then I construct the
variable housing asset share as the net value of housing assets divided by the total assets,
including both housing and non-housing assets. I focus on the unconditional share, which
combines the information about participation rate and conditional housing asset share.
The life-cycle profile of this unconditional share still preserves a hump shape. The variable
homeownership is defined as a dummy variable whose value is one if a household holds
a positive amount of housing assets. Regarding a household’s labor supply, I use the
employment status and the weekly hours of work reported in the SCF data.
To analyze the more recent years, I use the SCF data for 2007, 2010, and 2013. The
year 2007 represents the housing boom period. The years 2010 and 2013 together give
information about the recovery period after the bust. The way the variables are constructed
is analogous to that of 1995, and hence it is omitted.
2.1.2 Data to construct life-cycle profiles in 1970
I use two data sources to construct life-cycle profiles for the year 1970. First, I use
the 1970 Survey of Consumer Finances. This data is accessible via the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), whereas the SCF data since 1983 is
5. The description on how each variable is constructed is provided in Appendix 3.5.
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available from the Federal Reserve’s website. I use the raw data downloaded from ICPSR
and construct the variables of interest as outlined in Appendix 3.5. The value of using the
historical SCF data before 1983 has recently been highlighted by Kuhn et al. (2017), and
my paper is also in line with their attempt to incorporate this data to answer a question
that has not been answered: How much of the change in homeownership and housing
asset share can be accounted for by the change in marital transition probabilities?
However, there is a challenge to answering this question because the number of
observations of single households in the 1970 SCF is too small due to the high marriage
rate. This results in a very jagged life-cycle profile for single households. To obtain more
observations that can inform us about homeownership rate and housing asset share in
1970, I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, which is the longitudinal
household survey that has been administered since 1968.
Despite the larger number of observations in the 1970 PSID, it does not provide enough
information on households’ non-housing asset composition, which is essential information
to construct the housing asset share variable. Therefore, I use a cross-imputation strategy
similar to Blundell et al. (2005) to obtain a relation between housing assets and non-housing
assets from the 1970 SCF data and impute the missing non-housing assets for the PSID
sample using the fitted regression. The cross-imputation is done as follows: using the
1970 SCF sample, I first add 1% of average net value of housing to each household i’s net
value of housing, denoted by net value of housing†i,SCF. This is done in order to secure more
observations used in the regression of log-log specification. I regress this logged net value
of housing on the logged non-housing asset with various controls included in Xi,
log(net value of housing†i,SCF) = X
′
i,SCFβ + γ log(non-housing asseti,SCF) + ui,SCF.
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By using the estimated coefficients (β̂, γ̂) and assuming that the relation between
variables will be the same between the different data sets, we can obtain the cross-imputed
value of non-housing assets in the PSID data for household i as
̂non-housing asseti,PSID = exp
( log(net value of housing†i,PSID)− X′i,PSID β̂
γ̂
)
.
Using the imputed non-housing asset value and the observed housing asset value, I
construct the housing asset share for household i in the PSID as
̂housing asset sharei,PSID =
net value of housingi,PSID
net value of housingi,PSID + ̂non-housing asseti,PSID
.
In Table 2 in Appendix 3.5, I show that the regression applied to the 1970 SCF data to
obtain the estimates (β̂,γ̂) has an adjusted R-squared close to 0.8. Also, I show that the
mean, the median, and the standard deviation of the imputed housing asset share of the
PSID data are close to those observed in the SCF data.
2.1.3 Life-cycle profiles in 1970 and 1995
I construct the life-cycle profiles of single and married households in 1970 and 1995.
Figure 2 shows the change in homeownership rate and housing asset share over time
depending on marital status. First, the singles’ homeownership rate increased significantly
across all age groups between the two years. This is also the case for the singles’ housing
asset share. Since the pattern of change is qualitatively similar for the two housing vari-
ables, I focus on the change in homeownership in the following sections.
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Homeownership of the Single Homeownership of the Married
Housing Asset Share of the Single Housing Asset Share of the Married
Figure 2: Homeownership Rate and Housing Asset Share
Note: All figures show the average homeownership rate and the average housing asset share across
different age groups. The x-axis stands for the age of household head. Housing asset share is
defined to be the net housing value divided by the total assets.
For the married, the homeownership rate did not change significantly between 1970
and 1995 for younger households from age 25 to age 44.6 In contrast, the homeownership
rate increased significantly for older married households. Given that the main channel
of interest — the change in the likelihood of marriage and divorce — matters mostly for
the young, it is not expected to explain the increase in the homeownership rate for older
6. The null hypotheses of equal means are not rejected under 5% significance level for the age groups 25-29,
30-34, 35-39, and 40-44.
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people. What explains this change is left for future research. Interestingly, the housing
asset share was higher in 1970 compared to 1995 for younger married households.7 I
focus on this change in portfolio share of young married couples instead of the change in
homeownership rate. This is why Figure 1 includes the two housing variables showing
significant changes.
Many papers have attempted to explain the pattern that married households are more
likely to be homeowners than singles. In addition to this observation from the cross-section,
I aim to account for the within-group change in housing variables over time; first, the
increase in the singles’ homeownership rate, and second, the decrease in the marrieds’
housing asset share. I highlight that it is important to focus on heterogeneity in terms
of marital status in understanding the over-time changes in housing decisions. Then I
argue that the likelihood of household formation and dissolution plays a major role in
generating these changes over time. If a single is likely to marry soon, he will wait to
buy a house with a spouse because it is costly to sell or re-size a house. Furthermore, the
prospect of marriage creates a free rider problem that discourages singles from saving,
which makes it less likely for them to be homeowners. This may explain why the singles’
homeownership rate increased as they were less likely to marry. In addition, a married
couple who are likely to get divorced will tilt their portfolio away from housing asset since
it requires a large transaction cost when liquidation happens with a divorce. To formalize
this conjecture and quantify how much of the change in marital transition probabilities
can account for the change in housing variables, we need a structural model.
2.2 Life-cycle model
I develop a life-cycle model of single and married households who face age-dependent
marital transition shocks. Similar to Cubeddu and Rı´os-Rull (2003) and Ferna´ndez and
7. The null hypotheses of equal means are rejected under 5% significance level for age 25-30 and 35-40 and
rejected under 10% significance level for age 30-35 (p-value = 0.07).
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Wong (2014), marital status is treated as exogenous in order to build a computationally
tractable model of heterogeneous households.8 When making decisions, households will
take into account the probability of getting married or divorced.
Households decide how much to consume, rent, save in non-housing and housing
assets, and how many hours to work. For housing decisions, a finite number of housing
sizes are available to own. Owning a house is advantageous since it yields a higher service
flow than renting and it serves as a collateral for borrowing. However, it incurs substantial
transaction cost whenever its size is adjusted. Housing is a highly idiosyncratic investment,
so a change in status would make the house owned prior to the change no longer suitable.
For example, when you are single, you do not know what type of house your future
spouse may like. When you get married, you learn how your spouse values the jointly
owned home. The house you purchased as single is likely to be ill-suited for a married
couple. Hence, it is modeled that the owned house is sold and the associated transaction
cost arises in times of getting married or divorced.
Households face non-insurable idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks and idiosyn-
cratic housing price shocks. The framework is a partial equilibrium model in which
households face the following exogenous prices: wage, savings interest rate, borrowing
interest rate, and common house price. For now, the common house price is set to be fixed
to analyze the steady states. In Section 2.5, the common house price will be modeled as a
stochastic shock to study more recent periods with changing house prices.
Preference - Single agent. A single agent’s utility is specified by
8. Although people choose which type of family arrangement they live in, this paper treats it as exogenous
shocks stochastically generated by underlying probability distribution. On the other hand, there are a few
recent papers that endogenize households’ marital decisions in different contexts. For example, see Low
et al. (2018) and Reynoso (2018).
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u(c, s, l) =
(cαs1−α)(1−σ)
1− σ − Bs
l1+
1
γ
1 + 1γ
− φ · I(l > 0) + uhp(l),
where c ≥ 0 is consumption and s ≥ 0 is housing service. The service is defined as
s = m + ζ(h) · h, where m is from rented housing and ζ(h) · h is from owned housing. ζ(h)
is a size-dependent function of owned housing
ζ(h) =
(
ζ1 + ζ2
h− hmin
hmax − hmin
)
,
where hmin is the smallest non-zero size of owned housing and hmax is the biggest size.
ζ1 is the service gain of owning hmin-sized housing compared to renting. ζ2 reflects the
marginal gain for larger houses. ζ(h) is assumed to be greater than 1 to reflect that owned
housing is preferred to rented housing.9
On top of the change in marital transitions, there were substantial changes in earnings
risk and in the labor market environment between 1970 and 1995. Since I want to
incorporate these changes to the decomposition analysis in Section 2.4, I build a model
with endogenous labor supply. This will allow us to study how housing decisions as
lumpy investments change according to how agents adjust their hours in response to
various idiosyncratic shocks. l stands for labor supply associated with disutility from
working Bs and fixed cost of labor market participation φ. Also, there is utility from home
production
uhp(l) =

0 if one works
ωuhp if one does not work.
9. One could modify the owned house more easily to cater one’s needs. Also, there could be a moral hazard
issue with leasing agents, which makes renting less favorable, as pointed out in Postlewaite et al. (2008).
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The utility from home production while working is normalized to be zero. The
parameter ωuhp is identified from φ since I adopt a different functional form for the
married agent’s utility from home production.
Preference - Married agents. Within a married household, there is a head and a spouse.
They differ in terms of labor productivity denoted by y for the head and y˜ for the spouse.
This can be interpreted as each member of the household taking on a role depending on
comparative advantage in house management.
A married head’s utility uhead and a married spouse’s utility uspouse are specified below:
uhead(c, s, l, l˜) = ϕj
((γec)α(γes)1−α)1−σ
1− σ − Bm
l1+
1
γ
1 + 1γ
− φ · I(l > 0) + uhp(l, l˜)
uspouse(c, s, l, l˜) = ϕj
((γec)α(γes)1−α)1−σ
1− σ − B˜m
l˜1+
1
γ
1 + 1γ
− φ˜ · I(l˜ > 0) + uhp(l, l˜),
where c, s ≥ 0 is joint consumption and joint housing service. γe is a parameter that
transforms joint objects into per capita terms. If γe is greater than 0.5, it captures economies
of scale in consumption and service flow provided by marriage. ϕj allows for the marginal
utility of consumption and housing service to differ over the life-cycle. ϕj > 1 could result
from the joy of having a partner or children. Both the head and the spouse are constrained
to enjoy equal consumption and housing service.
l is labor supply of the head and l˜ is labor supply of the spouse. Labor supply is
associated with disutility from working Bm, B˜m and fixed cost of working φ, φ˜. The married
agent’s utility from home production is defined as
19
uhp(l, l˜) =

0 if both work
ωuhp
nψ if only one spouse works
ωuhp if no one works,
where nψ reflects whether home production technology is increasing returns to scale or not.
In an extreme case where nψ = 1.0, having two people stay at home and do the housework
generates the same utility as having one person do so.
2.2.1 Problem of the single at the terminal age
This section describes the recursive formulation of the single’s problem at the terminal
age J. The value function depends on the following state variables: age J, total asset a,
housing asset h, and labor productivity y. Households face exogenously given wage w,
risk-free savings interest rate r, borrowing interest rate rH , and common housing price PH .
To simplify the notation, I denote the vector of all the state variables as XsJ = [J, a, h, y].
Vs(XsJ) = max
c,m,b′ ,h′ ,l
u(c, s, l) + βVs, f in(b′, h′)
s.t. c + m + b′ + PHh′ = wyl + a−Φ(h′, h)
c ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, b′ ≥ 0.
Φ(h′, h) is the asymmetric transaction cost associated with illiquid housing asset. Similar
to Yang (2009), it is defined as
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Φ(h′, h) =

κbPHh′ + κsPHh if h′ 6= h
0 if h′ = h,
where κb < κs. Households are borrowing-constrained at the terminal age, which is
captured by non-housing asset b′ being non-negative.
The objective is to maximize the combination of current period utility and the dis-
counted continuation value of the remaining life. Vs, f in(b′, h′) is the continuation value
after age J, for 4 more periods where the household consumes the constant amount of
A ≡ (b′ + PHh′) 1−β1−β4 . The amount A is obtained by assuming that the discount factor
during the retirement is equal to 1(1+r) . This can be considered as submitting (b
′ + PHh′)
and entering a retirement community, which provides in return a constant flow of utility
in the future. The continuation value in this case is written as
Vs, f in(b′, h′) =
1− β4
1− β ·
A(1−σ)
1− σ .
2.2.2 Problem of the married at the terminal age
A married household’s problem at age J depends on one more state variable compared
to their single counterparts, since we also need to consider the labor efficiency shock y˜ of a
spouse. Similarly, I denote the vector of all the state variables as XmJ = [J, a, h, y, y˜].
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A married household solves a joint problem that maximizes the average utility with
equal weights. In other words, a marriage is a contract to obey the decision of a utilitarian
social planner maximizing the average utility. The average utility at the current period is
u(c, s, l, l˜) =
uhead(c, s, l, l˜) + uspouse(c, s, l, l˜)
2
= ϕj
((γec)α(γes)1−α)1−σ
1− σ −
1
2
(
Bm
l1+
1
γ
1 + 1γ
+ B˜m
l˜1+
1
γ
1 + 1γ
)
− 1
2
(
φ · I(l > 0) + φ˜ · I(l˜ > 0)
)
+ uhp(l, l˜).
Then the problem solved by the married household is
Vm(XmJ ) = max
c,m,b′ ,h′ ,l,l˜
u(c, s, l, l˜) + βVm, f in(b′, h′)
s.t. c + m + b′ + PHh′ = w(yl + y˜l˜) + a−Φ(h′, h)
c ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, b′ ≥ 0.
The household’s labor income includes both the head’s and the spouse’s labor income.
The choice variables are analogous to the single household’s problem except that the
married household also needs to decide labor supply of the spouse l˜.10
The continuation value Vm, f in(b′, h′) is analogous to the single’s case. The household
does not face marital transition shock at the terminal age J. Each member of the household
is assumed to identically evaluate the joint consumption amount A = (b′ + PHh′) 1−β1−β4
provided by the retirement community. There is efficiency gain γe in consumption from
marriage. The continuation value then becomes
10. Marriage in this setup is interpretable as the change in one’s preference to care about the other members
in the household. Instead of the arrangement set by a utilitarian social planner, the married household’s
problem can also be understood as each spouse having the identical non-egoistic preference u(c, s, l, l˜) as
above. Then the agent’s problem, given the joint budget constraint, amounts to the problem solved by the
married household.
22
Vm, f in(b′, h′) =
1− β4
1− β · ϕJ
(γeA)(1−σ)
1− σ .
2.2.3 Problem of the single at the non-terminal age
At the non-terminal age, the expected value should take into account the marital shock.
I denote the vector of all the state variables as Xsj = [j, a, h, y]. The single household’s
problem at age j < J is written as follows:
Vs(Xsj ) = maxc,m,b′ ,h′ ,l
{
u(c, s, l) + β[qss,j ·EVs(j + 1, a′, h′, y′)
+ qsm,j ·EVm(j + 1, (a′ + a˜′)− κsPH(h′ + h˜′), 0, y′, y˜′)]
}
s.t. c + m + b′ + PHh′ = wyl + a−Φ(h′, h)
a′ = (1 + r(b′))b′ + PH(1− δ′)h′, where r(b′) =

r if b′ ≥ 0
rH otherwise
c ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, b′ ≥ −ηPHh′ with 0 ≤ η ≤ 1.
The single household’s value function depends on the same state variables as in the
terminal period’s problem. A single stays single with age-dependent probability qss,j. Then
the expected value is based on the current period savings and housing choice in addition
to future labor efficiency. The single household gets married with probability qsm,j. This
renders the continuation value equal to the average utility from the marriage arrangement.
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It is assumed that one gets married to a spouse of the same age group. This is consistent
with the empirical fact that the average age differential of a married couple is 3.8 years in
1995, which is less than the 5-year model period. When computing the expected value, we
need to consider the potential spouse’s distribution with respect to total asset a˜′, housing
asset h˜′, and labor efficiency y˜′.
To have random matching is computationally costly with rational expectation since
consistency is required between the potential spouse’s distribution of assets and the
equilibrium distribution of assets of singles. Instead, I decide to model the expectation
with bounded rationality as follows: assume that the potential spouse’s housing asset
distribution Ωj(h˜) depends on age j. Since we know the homeownership rate of singles
over the life-cycle from the data, we can incorporate this information to discipline Ωj(h˜)
such that
Ωj(h˜ = 0) = 1− homeownership rate at age j
Ωj(h˜ = hmin) = homeownership rate at age j,
where hmin is the minimum non-zero housing asset level.11 Since the homeownership
rate is increasing with age, a younger single is more likely to meet a spouse without
housing assets. Using this distribution, the mean of housing assets in equilibrium turns
out to be close to the mean of the potential spouse’s housing assets. I assume perfect
sorting in terms of non-housing asset b˜, which induces the distribution over total asset a˜
coupled with Ωj(h˜). Simplifying the sorting pattern with respect to non-housing assets
is based on the empirical observation that housing assets account for the biggest part of
11. Since the model will be estimated with the moments including the life-cycle profile of homeownership rate
of singles, the potential spouse’s housing asset distribution used to form expectation will be consistent
with the ownership in equilibrium. However, the consistency over housing asset levels is not guaranteed.
Even though I forgo some accuracy, the potential spouse’s housing asset distribution captures the reality
in that single homeowners tend to own a small house.
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most households’ portfolios. Lastly, I assume the potential spouse’s labor efficiency is
distributed according to the stationary distribution of labor efficiency y˜.12
Once a single gets married, the couple not only have to sell the housing assets they
accumulated while single, but they also have to pay the transaction costs of doing so.
Although this setting simplifies the reality, it still captures the fact that married households
tend to resize or buy a new house within 5 years after getting married. The prohibitive
transaction costs could also reflect potential moving or relocation costs associated with
marriage. With the remaining wealth after combining two people’s assets and selling off
the houses owned before marriage, the married couple can choose a new level of housing
asset in the next period to maximize the average utility. It is worth noting that there is no
margin of disagreement when the couple solve a joint problem.
Households receive the idiosyncratic house price shock δ on top of the common house
price PH. Depending on the shock, the total asset a household carries to the next age
differs. I assume that δ is uniformly distributed on [δ, δ¯]. If δ < 0 and δ¯ > 0, the price
shock covers both depreciation and appreciation. Also, households at the non-terminal
age have access to collateralized borrowing. η captures the tightness of collateralized
borrowing constraint b′ ≥ −ηPHh′. That is, (1− η) reflects the downpayment constraint
requirement. The borrowing interest rate rH is given to be higher than the savings interest
rate r.13
2.2.4 Problem of the married at the non-terminal age
The married household solves a joint problem that maximizes the average utility. The
married household’s problem with Xmj = [j, a, h, y, y˜] is written as follows:
12. Marriage market clearing is not considered in this model. Instead, singles are modeled to have a belief
that they will meet a spouse with labor productivity y˜, which has a different support from y.
13. This could be from financial intermediation or from default risk. I treat this borrowing rate to be exogenous
instead of endogenizing it. For endogenizing the borrowing rate by explicitly modeling short-term or
long-term mortgages, see Jeske et al. (2013) and Favilukis et al. (2017).
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Vm(Xmj ) = max
c,m,b′ ,h′ ,l,l˜
{
u(c, s, l, l˜) + β
[
qmm,j ·EVm(j + 1, a′, h′, y′, y˜′)
+ qms,j ·EVs(j + 1, 0.5(a′ − κsPHh′), 0, y′)
]}
s.t. c + m + b′ + PHh′ = w(yl + y˜l˜) + a−Φ(h′, h)
a′ = (1 + r(b′))b′ + PH(1− δ′)h′, where r(b′) =

r if b′ ≥ 0
rH otherwise
c ≥ 0, s ≥ 0, b′ ≥ −ηPHh′ with 0 ≤ η ≤ 1.
The choice variables are analogous to the single’s problem except that the married
household needs to make an additional decision on spousal labor supply l˜ given the
spouse’s labor productivity y˜.
With probability qmm,j, the married household stays married with the same spouse. It is
not possible to be married to different spouses for two consecutive periods. In other words,
there is no reshuffling of spouses. With probability qms,j, the married household becomes
separated or divorced. With this status change, the divorced single agent becomes egoistic
and his/her labor productivity is again distributed over the support of y. So each spouse
has the same outlook of the future, which eliminates the margin of disagreement. Upon
separation, the joint house is sold and the associated cost is paid. After this transaction,
the remaining joint assets are equally divided between the couple.14
14. There can be other ways of dividing joint assets after separation or divorce. Voena (2015) studied how
various divorce laws on property division affect couples’ intertemporal decisions.
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2.2.5 Shocks
Labor efficiency shock y at age j is modeled to be combination of age trend χ(j) from
Hansen (1993) and idiosyncratic shock x of AR(1) after taken log.
y = χ(j)x
log(x′) = ρx log(x) + ex
ex ∼ N(0, σ2x ) i.i.d.
Idiosyncratic house price shock δ is modeled to be uniformly distributed with lower
bound δ and upper bound δ¯, δ ∼ U[δ, δ¯]. Additionally, households face the age-dependent
marital transition shocks with the associated probabilities qss,j, qsm,j, qms,j, and qmm,j. The
common house price PH is set to be fixed to analyze 1970 and 1995 as two steady states.
However, this will be extended to model time-varying house prices over the 2000s as a
stochastic shock. The parameterization of each shock will be covered in the following
section.
2.3 Estimation of model parameters
I set parameters of the model in two ways. First, some parameters are set by using
parameter values in the literature or by using the estimates from the data without relying
on the dynamic model. Then the remaining parameters are estimated using a limited
information Bayesian approach, which matches the life-cycle profiles from the data and
those generated from the model. I estimate the parameters for the baseline year 1995.
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2.3.1 Externally set parameters
Demographics and endowments. Individuals start their life at age 25 and retire at age 65.
One model period corresponds to five years, implying that non-retired individuals live for
8 periods. There is no mortality shock during these periods. Once they retire, households
receive a fixed amount of payment for 4 more periods before they die with certainty. I
use the observed asset distribution of households aged 20 to 24 in the 1995 SCF data to
determine initial asset distribution in the model.
Preferences. The discount factor β is set to be 0.94 in annual term. I set the coefficient
of relative risk aversion σ to 5. The Frisch elasticity γ is set to be 0.5 following the macro
estimates of γ as reviewed in Keane and Rogerson (2015).
Labor productivity. The labor productivity consists of two parts: a life-cycle component
and an idiosyncratic shock. The life-cycle profile of labor productivity χ(j) is set to match
the estimates of Hansen (1993). The idiosyncratic shock follows AR(1) after taken log. I
set ρx = 0.75 and σx = 0.4. These values are close to the estimates in Ferna´ndez and Wong
(2014), which are within the ranges of values in the previous literature (Storesletten et al.,
2004; Chang and Kim, 2006).15 Ferna´ndez and Wong (2014) also use a five-year period. For
the married spouse, the process is modeled to be less persistent with a higher standard
deviation.
15. I simulate the process wt in Ferna´ndez and Wong (2014) with (ρ, ση , σe) = (0.969, 0.076, 0.034) using
wt = zt + ηt , ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η ), zt = ρzt−1 + et , et ∼ N(0, σ2e ).
Then I estimate AR(1) process using the simulated series for 10000 periods to obtain the persistence
parameter ρx = 0.75. Then I set σx to be in the ranges of previous literature.
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Marriage-related parameters. The scale parameter nψ of home production is set to be 1.34
for the married as in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007).
Age 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64
ϕj 1.11 1.23 1.30 1.32 1.22 1.10 1.0 1.0
Table 1: Values for ϕj
To construct the life-cycle profile of ϕj, I rely on the OECD household member weight
as used in Pizzinelli (2018) and the average number of children in the 1995 Census data.
The age-dependent marriage probabilities qsm,j are computed by a similar logistic
regression as in Borella et al. (2017). Age and squared age are used as regressors. Cohort
or time effect is not controlled. For 1970’s probabilities, the PSID data from 1970 to 1974 is
used. For 1995, the data from 1995 to 1999 is used. Since there are fewer divorces than
marriages, I also rely on the divorce probabilities computed from the Divorce Registration
Area (DRA) data reported in Clarke (1995). The age-dependent divorce probabilities qms,j
of 1995 are computed as the average of the probabilities for 1990 in Clarke (1995) and the
probabilities computed by a logistic regression using the PSID data from 1995 to 1999 with
age and squared age controlled.
Borrowing constraint and prices. Households are subject to collateralized borrowing
constraint where the parameter η captures how relaxed the constraint is. I set η = 0.75,
based on the mean loan-to-value (LTV) for prime mortgages from Freddie Mac. The
interest rate for savings is set to be 0.02, and the interest rate for borrowing is set to be
0.07 per annum. Hence the net interest margin between savings and borrowing is 0.05,
which is close to the value in 1995 from the FRED data.
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Marriage Probabilities Divorce Probabilities
Figure 3: Marriage and Divorce Probabilities
Housing-related parameters. For the transaction cost of owned housing, I follow Yang
(2009) so that 2.5% of the home value is paid when buying and 7% is paid when selling.
Lastly, idiosyncratic house price shock is modeled to be uniform between δ and δ¯. I set
δ = −0.25, which is close to the average price increase for 10 major U.S. metropolitan areas
(Composite 10) from the Case-Shiller house price index.16 I set δ¯ = 0.15, whose value is
similar to the 2.5th percentile of price change for all states from 1995 to 1999. The common
house price PH is calibrated to match the price-to-rent ratio.
In the decomposition analysis in Section 2.4, I treat 1970 and 1995 as two steady states
with the same common house price but with different marriage and divorce prospects.
When analyzing the more recent years with changing house prices, I model the common
house price to be a shock similar to Corbae and Quintin (2015). Referring to the price
index by Shiller (2000)17, real home values were relatively stable between 1890 and 2013,
except for two periods. The first exception is from 1920 to 1939, which featured low home
values. The other is the recent housing price boom, which lasted from 1999 until the crisis.
16. Given that major metropolitan areas tend to experience sharper housing price increase, I use the average
of Composite 10 as the upper bound. Composite 10 includes Boston, Chicago, Denver, Las Vegas, Los
Angeles, Miami, New York, San Diego, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.
17. http://www.econ.yale.edu/∼shiller/data.htm
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Hence, the common house price is modeled as PHt = P
H × zt, where zt is a three-point
process
zt ∈ [0.7, 1, 1.3]
with a Markov transition matrix. The support is set from the observation that the average
home values during low times are about 30 percent below the corresponding average
during normal times. Symmetrically, the highest price is set to be 30% higher than the
middle price.18 The transition matrix ΠPH is set as

0.75 0.25 0
0.045 0.91 0.045
0 0.375 0.625
 .
This matrix is set based on the following: the middle price is maintained from 1940 to
1995, which corresponds to 11 model periods. Deviations to lowest level are expected to
last for 20 years. Lastly, deviations to highest level are expected to last for about 13 years.
Table 2 summarizes the externally set parameters and their sources.
2.3.2 Estimated parameters
I estimate the remaining parameters by a limited information Bayesian approach as
in Christiano et al. (2010) and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2016). Structural estimation
such as mine has advantages for several reasons. First, we can discipline estimation with
various moments of interest. Since I want my model to be able to account for households’
housing and labor supply decisions, I use the relevant life-cycle profiles of homeownership
rates, housing asset share, and labor force participation rates across singles and married
18. This is in line with the observation that the real house price in 2005, which can represent the boom period,
was 30% higher than the price in 1995.
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Parameter Value Source
Preference
β 0.94 —
σ 5.0 —
γ 0.5 Keane and Rogerson (2015)
Labor Productivity
χ(j) — Hansen (1993)
ρx (ρx˜) 0.75 (0.73) Ferna´ndez and Wong (2014)
σx (σx˜) 0.4 (0.42) Chang and Kim (2006)
Marriage
nψ 1.34 Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007)
ϕj — Pizzinelli (2018), Census
qsm,j, qms,j — Divorce registration area (DRA) data, PSID
Borrowing Constraint
η 0.75 Freddie Mac mean LTV for prime mortgages
(r, rH) (0.02, 0.07) Net interest margin of banks (FRED)
Housing Market
(κb, κs) (0.025, 0.07) Yang (2009)
(δ, δ¯) (-0.25, 0.15) Case-Shiller house price index
Table 2: Externally Set Parameter Values
households. Second, we are able to learn uncertainty associated with parameters in
contrast to calibration. For instance, we can construct a confidence interval or a credible set
for each parameter of interest. We can also quantify the uncertainty in the life-cycle profiles
induced from the parameter estimates. Lastly, one advantage of a Bayesian approach is
that we can explicitly incorporate prior beliefs and combine them with information from
the data. A limited information Bayesian procedure is closely related to the simulated
method of moments, but it has an advantage of adding prior beliefs from micro evidence
or previous literature. As a special case, a Bayesian inference becomes analogous to a
classical inference if one chooses uniform priors as I do in this paper. But one can use
informative priors and also check how robust the choice of priors is. This will be clear in
the following explanation of a limited information Bayesian procedure.
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I denote the data moments to match as ψ̂. The goal is to choose a parameter vector θ to
make the model-simulated moments ψ(θ) be as close as possible to ψ̂. The approximate
likelihood of ψ̂ is written as
f (ψ̂|θ) =
(
1
2pi
)M
2
|V¯|− 12× exp
[
− 1
2
(ψ̂− ψ(θ))′V¯−1(ψ̂− ψ(θ))
]
,
where M is the number of moments in ψ̂ and V¯ is obtained by a bootstrap approach with
NB bootstrap samples as
V¯ =
1
NB
NB
∑
b=1
(ψb − ψ¯)(ψb − ψ¯)′,
where ψb stands for the moments from the b-th bootstrap sample and ψ¯ is the mean of ψb
for b = 1, . . . , NB. To provide context, there are not many observations for middle-aged
and elderly singles. This procedure will choose to weight more young singles’ moments if
they show lower variance.
The Bayesian posterior of θ conditional on ψ̂ is derived as
f (θ|ψ̂) = f (ψ̂|θ)p(θ)
f (ψ̂)
,
where p(θ) denotes the priors on θ and f (ψ̂) denotes the marginal density of ψ̂, where
f (ψ̂) =
∫
f (ψ̂|θ)p(θ)dθ. Then I characterize the posterior density using the Random-Walk
Metropolis Hastings sampler with the objective function
g(θ) ≡ log f (ψ̂|θ) + log p(θ).
The proposal covariance-variance matrix Ωproposal is obtained by multiplying a constant
c to the diagonal matrix Ω whose elements are equal to prior variances, Ωproposal = c×Ω.
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As the chain runs, c is updated as in Herbst and Schorfheide (2018) so that the acceptance
rate x gets closer to the target 0.25:
c′ = c×
(
0.95 + 0.1× e
16(x−0.25)
1 + e16(x−0.25)
)
.
Table 3 shows the parameters to be estimated and their priors. I use the uniform priors
for all the parameters. This reflects that the prior belief does not favor certain values over
the others within the support. This belief would be updated with the curvature provided
by the difference between the moments from the data and those from the model. Given
this prior specification, this procedure can be considered as pseudo-likelihood estimation
in classical inference.
Parameter Distribution Support Description
ζ1 Uniform [1.0, 1.5] Service flow from owned housing (intercept)
ζ2 Uniform [0.0, 1.0] Service flow from owned housing (slope)
ωuhp Uniform [0.0, 2.0] Utility from home production
γe Uniform [0.5, 1.0] Economies of scale within marriage
α Uniform [0.4, 0.9] Aggregator for consumption and housing
Bs Uniform [10.0, 100.0] Disutility from working (single)
Bm Uniform [10.0, 100.0] Disutility from working (married head)
B˜m Uniform [10.0, 100.0] Disutility from working (married spouse)
φ Uniform [0.0, 2.0] Fixed cost of working (head)
φ˜ Uniform [0.0, 2.0] Fixed cost of working (spouse)
Table 3: Priors
The moments used in this procedure include 1995’s life-cycle profiles for homeowner-
ship rates, housing asset share, and labor force participation rates for single and married
households respectively. For instance, ζ1 is identified from the levels of homeownership
rate whereas ζ2 is identified from the variations in housing asset share over the life-cycle.
Without ωuhp, the model cannot generate married household heads to work more than
singles on average. Hence ωuhp is identified from the gap in the labor force participation
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between married heads of households and singles. Due to economies of scale for con-
sumption and housing services within marriage, investment in housing assets is bigger
(and that in non-housing assets is smaller) for a married couple compared to their single
counterpart. γe is identified from how steeply the housing asset share increases for the
married compared to singles. α is obtained from the overall levels of housing asset share
and φ, φ˜ are from the levels of labor force participation for the single and for the married
spouse respectively. Lastly, Bs, Bm, B˜m are identified from how labor supply decreases over
the life-cycle. If the disutility of working is high, the decrease in labor supply will be
steeper as one gets older.
I obtain the posterior estimates based on 8000 iterations with the average acceptance
rate 0.24. Table 4 shows some percentiles from the prior and the posterior distributions.
One advantage of estimation is that we can see the uncertainty associated with each
parameter. By using the 5th percentile and 95th percentile of the posterior draws, we can
construct the 90% credible set for each parameter. In Appendix 3.5, I provide the histogram
of each parameter’s posterior distribution and the cumulative mean of the posterior draws.
Prior Posterior
Parameter 5% 50% 95% 5% 50% 95%
ζ1 1.025 1.25 1.475 1.163 1.364 1.480
ζ2 0.05 0.5 0.95 0.048 0.341 0.938
ωuhp 0.1 1.0 1.9 0.224 1.015 1.858
γe 0.525 0.75 0.975 0.558 0.607 0.679
α 0.425 0.65 0.875 0.458 0.538 0.593
Bs 14.5 55 95.5 33.814 48.670 58.964
Bm 14.5 55 95.5 10.731 17.491 46.067
B˜m 14.5 55 95.5 19.046 48.318 74.348
φ 0.1 1.0 1.9 0.370 1.374 1.932
φ˜ 0.1 1.0 1.9 0.097 0.827 1.736
Table 4: Prior and Posterior Distributions of Estimated Parameters
Note: The columns show 5th, 50th, 95th percentiles of prior and posterior distributions.
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2.3.3 Model fit
Figure 4 shows the model fit for the 1995 data. The model-generated life-cycle profiles
are obtained by using the posterior median, which is shaded in Table 4. The model
does a great job of matching the life-cycle profiles of homeownership rates and housing
asset share depending on marital status. Also, it matches the labor force participation
of household heads well. The model captures the overall life-cycle profile of spousal
labor force participation in the data, even though I do not model many other factors that
potentially affect spousal labor supply. It is meaningful to get the spousal labor supply
pattern close to the data, because I want to experiment with the change in spousal labor
supply over time.
The in-sample fit is also analyzed by posterior predictive checks reported in Figure 5. I
simulate the life-cycle profiles for 50 different posterior draws that are equally-distanced
over the sampler. From Figure 4 based on the posterior median, we observe some gaps
between the model-generated life-cycle profiles and the data’s. The hairlines generated
from the predictive checks allow us to see whether these discrepancies are big or not given
the uncertainty involved. For example, the life-cycle profiles of homeownership rates are
quite precisely estimated whereas there is more uncertainty associated with spousal labor
supply profiles. In addition, the hairlines for housing asset share are more spread out for
younger singles compared to older ones. Hence, the estimation procedure provides us
with measures of uncertainty and some insights that one would not otherwise get with
calibration.
Lastly, the model is validated with some unmatched moments in Table 5 that are not
included in the sampler.
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Homeownership Rate Housing Asset Share
Labor Force Participation (Head) Labor Force Participation (Spouse)
Figure 4: Life-Cycle Profiles: Model vs. Data
Note: Solid line - Model, Dotted line - Data, Blue - Single, Red with circle - Married.
Variable Model Data
Housing wealth to consumption ratio 2.13 2.3
Wealth to income ratio 2.98 3.0-3.5
Rent to income ratio 0.23 0.21
Ratio of mean hours worked (Single/Married:Head) 0.81 0.82
Ratio of mean hours worked (Married:Spouse/Married:Head) 0.62 0.66
Table 5: Unmatched Moments: Model vs. Data
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Figure 5: Predictive Checks of Posterior Draws
Note: Each hairline corresponds to a draw from the posterior distribution.
2.4 Decomposition analysis: 1970 vs. 1995
Given the model and the parameter estimates, I can answer the main question of
how much of the change in marital transition probabilities can account for the change in
housing variables. In addition to this change in marriage and divorce probabilities, other
changes that may be key drivers of households’ housing decisions occurred. The goal of
this section is to quantify the explanatory power of the main channel while controlling for
other changes to affect housing decisions studied in the literature.
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2.4.1 Major changes between 1970 and 1995
(1) Marital transition probabilities
This change is the main channel of interest in this paper. I use the age-dependent
marriage and divorce probabilities as in Figure 3. The baseline life-cycle profiles are
generated by using the marriage and divorce probabilities in 1995. In this decomposition
exercise, I feed in the probabilities in 1970 instead, holding the other things fixed, to see
how the housing variables would have looked under this scenario.
(2) Downpayment constraint
Downpayment constraint was tighter in 1970 compared to 1995. Fisher and Gervais
(2011) point out that the average downpayment in the 1990s was about the two-thirds
value of the average in the 1970s. The parameter governing the tightness of the borrowing
constraint is η. The baseline η is set to be 0.75, which equals 25% downpayment constraint.
Instead, I use η = 0.65 for 1970, which is a similar value as documented in Bullard (2012).
(3) Labor market volatility
The increase in labor market volatility is widely documented as in Fisher and Gervais
(2011) and Santos and Weiss (2013). The parameter associated with earnings risk is σx and
σx˜. The parameters for 1970 are set to reflect the 40% increase in volatility from 1970 to
1995 as reported in Fisher and Gervais (2011).
(4) Spousal labor productivity and fixed cost of working
From 1970 to 1995, the gender wage gap shrank and the labor force participation of
spouses increased substantially. Heathcote et al. (2010) show that the average female wage
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increased by about 15% from 1970 to 1995. I set the value of χ˜(j) in 1970 to reflect this
change while fixing the household head’s χ(j).
However, the labor productivity change is not sufficient to generate the observed
change in spousal labor force participation. Therefore, I also change the parameter φ˜
governing the fixed cost of working. φ˜ is set to be higher in 1970 so that the average
spousal labor force participation rate matches 0.52 in 1970.
2.4.2 The effect of each channel
I show how each change affects the housing decisions of single and married households.
I look at the singles’ homeownership rates and the marrieds’ housing asset share, since
these variables changed significantly between 1970 and 1995.
Single: Homeownership Married: Housing Asset Share
Figure 6: The Effect of the Change in Marital Transition Probabilities on Housing Decisions
Note: The black lines are generated from the model using the marriage and divorce probabilities in
1995 (baseline). The red lines are obtained by applying the marriage and divorce probabilities in
1970, holding the other things identical to the baseline specification.
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(1) Marital transition probabilities
The red lines in Figure 6 are obtained by changing the marriage and divorce probabilities
to be 1970’s values. I focus on the age groups from 25 to 44 years old since marital
transitions happen relatively early in life. In the left panel of Figure 6, the homeownership
rate for young singles becomes lower under the high marriage probabilities of 1970. It
is worth noting that the gap between the red line and the black line closes as we look
at older ages. This captures that the difference in marriage probabilities between 1970
and 1995 is more conspicuous for those in their 20s or early 30s. The mechanism that
generates this drop in homeownership is as follows: a single who expects to get married
in the near future will refrain from owning a house due to the transaction costs of selling
or resizing. In addition, the prospect of marriage, which causes a free rider problem with
asset pooling, prevents singles from saving.
For the married households, they face lower divorce probabilities in 1970. Due to
reduced idiosyncratic risk of separation, their precautionary savings motive diminishes,
which could reduce the homeownership rate of the married. On the other hand, the
housing asset share increases with lower divorce probabilities. Under the 1970 probabilities,
the expected return on housing goes up as it is less likely to incur transaction costs
associated with divorce. As shown in the right panel of Figure 6, the marrieds’ housing
asset share is bigger under 1970’s likelihood of divorce. The gap between the red line and
the black line does not close for the housing asset share, which reflects that the gap in
divorce probabilities do not get narrower even up to age 44.
I do not use different values for marriage and remarriage probabilities. The remarriage
probabilities reported in the Current Population Reports by Bruno and Glick (1971) are
still higher than the marriage probabilities in 1995. My decomposition analysis captures
the reality consistently in that the married households in 1970 expected remarriage after
divorce to be more likely compared to the households in 1995.
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Single: Homeownership Married: Housing Asset Share
Figure 7: The Effect of Each Channel on Housing Decisions
Note: The black lines are generated from the 1995 baseline specification. The red lines are obtained
by only changing the marital transition probabilities to be 1970’s values, holding the other things
identical to the baseline specification. The other lines are also obtained by only applying one
change to mimic the 1970’s economy while preserving the others as in 1995; compared to the
baseline, the blue lines are with tighter downpayment constraint, the pink lines are with lower
labor volatility, and the cyan lines are with lower spousal labor productivity.
(2) Downpayment constraint
Figure 7 includes the life-cycle profiles generated by each channel considered between
1970 and 1995. The red lines are the same as in Figure 6, showing the effect of marriage
and divorce risk. The blue lines are generated by changing the borrowing constraint to
mimic 1970’s environment while holding the other things fixed to 1995’s values.
The borrowing constraint of interest is b′ ≥ −ηPHh′. With a tighter borrowing con-
straint as in 1970, the singles’ homeownership rates decrease a little whereas the marrieds’
homeownership rates do not change much. However, the average house size for the
married becomes smaller, which results in a decrease in housing asset share. In other
words, the intensive margin adjusts with the financial constraint change although the
extensive margin does not change much for married households. Still, the overall change
in housing variables does not seem to be substantial, with the only change in the loan-to-
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value parameter η from 0.75 to 0.65. However, this does not rule out the possibility that
relaxed credit constraints have a decisive effect on housing decisions in times of housing
price booms or busts. This will be studied more closely in Section 2.5.
(3) Labor market volatility
With 40% lower labor market volatility, labor supply increases for all household
members.19 Furthermore, the level of income in each state changes with diminishing
income risk. I check whether the average household labor income is almost identical before
and after the change in volatility. There is only about a 2% increase in the average labor
income from this change, so the essential differences in housing decisions will be mostly
from the income risk.
Income risk exerts two opposing forces on homeownership. On the one hand, it is
valuable to delay buying a house until a household can afford it due to the large transaction
cost and income risk. This can lower the homeownership rate, especially for the young who
do not have much wealth. On the other hand, the increase in risk raises the precautionary
savings. This savings can induce more transition from renting to home purchase, thereby
increasing the homeownership rate. Under the baseline parameterization, the latter force
dominates the former so the homeownership rate decreases under lower income risk. This
is the case for both the single and the married.
In terms of housing asset share, the magnitude of change in percentage is smaller than
that of homeownership rate. This is because the reduced precautionary savings motive is
split between housing assets and non-housing assets. If there was only one asset available
in which to invest, say a housing asset, then the decrease in homeownership rate would
have been larger as it would have absorbed all the reduction in precautionary savings
19. This pattern is the opposite of the data’s pattern since the spousal labor supply was much smaller in 1970.
The change to capture spousal labor supply correctly is studied below.
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motive. With multiple assets, households can adjust, and therefore the portfolio share of
housing assets does not fall as much.
(4) Spousal labor productivity and fixed cost of working
Married: Head Married: Spouse
Figure 8: Life-Cycle Profiles of Labor Force Participation (Married Households)
The homeownership rate for both the single and the married are not affected much
by the change in spousal labor force participation. Especially for the married, this is
because a head can increase labor supply as his/her spouse’s labor supply diminishes.
Figure 8 shows how the life-cycle profiles of labor force participation change as I apply the
lower spousal labor productivity χ˜(j) and the higher fixed cost of working φ˜. This result
is consistent with the observed pattern in the data that the married heads worked more
in 1970 than those in 1995. With the endogenous labor supply, the homeownership rate
does not necessarily fall with a decreased spousal labor supply since the other household
member can adjust his/her labor supply upward.
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2.4.3 Decomposition with the data
In this section, I look at the changes in housing variables from the real-world data
between 1970 and 1995 and quantify how much of the change can be accounted for by the
change in marital transition probabilities.
(1) Homeownership of single households
Data Counterfactuals
Figure 9: Homeownership of the Single (Data vs. Counterfactuals)
Note: Case (I) denotes the counterfactual homeownership rate generated by applying the change
in downpayment constraint, labor volatility, and spousal labor productivity to mimic 1970 while
holding the other things as 1995’s values. Note that the marriage and divorce probabilities are kept
as 1995’s values for Case (I). Case (II) is obtained by additionally applying 1970’s probabilities of
marital transitions to Case (I).
The homeownership rate of single households was lower in 1970 compared to
that in 1995 as shown in the left panel of Figure 9. The right panel of Figure 9 includes
two counterfactual life-cycle profiles of homeownership. First, the blue dotted line is
generated by applying all the changes except for the marriage and divorce probabilities.
In other words, the marital transition probabilities are kept as 1995’s values, whereas
the downpayment constraint, labor volatility, and spousal labor productivity are set to
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reflect 1970’s environment. All the changes except for the marital transition probabilities
induce homeownership to fall compared to the baseline in 1995. However, this does not
generate a sufficient drop to match that which is observed in the data, especially for young
households in their 20s. The red dashed line in Figure 9 is obtained once I additionally
incorporate 1970’s marriage and divorce probabilities. As younger singles refrain from
buying a house under the likelihood of marriage in 1970, the homeownership rate drops
further from the blue dotted line.
Data Counterfactuals
Age % Change Case (I) Case (II)
25 - 29 -61% -24% -56%
30 - 34 -30% -11% -16%
35 - 39 -29% -16% -19%
40 - 44 -30% -18% -21%
Average -38% -17% -28%
Table 6: Homeownership of the Single (Data vs. Counterfactuals)
Table 6 quantifies the change in percentage, taking the year 1995 as the benchmark.
For instance, the homeownership of single households of age 25-29 was 61% lower in 1970
compared to 1995. The third column, Case (I), shows the counterfactual homeownership
rates generated by applying all the changes except for the marriage and divorce proba-
bilities. By taking the average over the age groups from 25 to 44 years, this specification
generates the 17% drop in homeownership compared to the baseline. In summary, 45% of
the change observed in the data can be explained by the combined change captured by
Case (I).
The last column, Case (II), shows the values obtained by additionally applying 1970’s
marriage and divorce probabilities to Case (I). This specification generates the average of
28% drop in homeownership rate from age 25 to 44. In other words, 29% of the change
can be accounted for by the change in marriage and divorce probabilities. The change in
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marital transitions seems to be quantitatively of comparable importance to the combined
effect of borrowing constraints, earnings risk, and spousal productivity.
(2) Housing asset share of married households
Figure 10 shows that the housing asset share was higher in 1970 than in 1995. The
blue line from the changes except for the marital transition probabilities shows a small
decrease in the housing asset share. Since the reduced precautionary savings motive is
split between housing asset and non-housing asset, the housing asset share does not fall
as much as the homeownership would fall. On the other hand, the reduction of divorce
risk induces married households to tilt their portfolio towards housing assets. This change
is reflected in the red dashed line of Figure 10.
Data Counterfactuals
Figure 10: Housing Asset Share of the Married (Data vs. Counterfactuals)
Note: Case (I) denotes the counterfactual housing asset share generated by applying the change
in downpayment constraint, labor volatility, and spousal labor productivity to mimic 1970 while
holding the other things as 1995’s values. Note that the marriage and divorce probabilities are kept
as 1995’s values for Case (I). Case (II) is obtained by additionally applying 1970’s probabilities of
marital transitions to Case (I).
47
Table 7 summarizes the change in percentage of housing asset share. Without the
change in marital transition probabilities, the average change has the negative sign, which is
the opposite of what we observe in the data. However, once incorporating 1970’s marriage
and divorce probabilities, the direction of change becomes consistent with the data. With
all the changes applied, 31% of the observed change in portfolio share can be generated.
This decomposition analysis emphasizes that the change in marital transition probabilities
is an important risk factor when it comes to understanding the change in housing decisions.
Data Counterfactuals
Age % Change Case (I) Case (II)
25 - 29 +17% -3% +8%
30 - 34 +11% -3% +7%
35 - 39 +18% -2% +5%
40 - 44 +6% -11% -6%
Average +13% -3% +4%
Table 7: Housing Asset Share of the Married (Data vs. Counterfactuals)
2.5 Recent experiences in the housing market
The change in marital transition probabilities is shown to help account for the change in
housing variables between 1970 and 1995. The question in this section is whether marital
transitions have continued to change and, if so, whether they are still useful to understand
the changing housing variables in recent years. In the previous decomposition analysis,
the two years — 1970 and 1995 — were deliberately chosen because while the real house
prices were similar in levels, the marital transition probabilities were different. This allows
us to study the effect of marital transition probabilities while controlling for the house
price, which is a confounding factor. Furthermore, cohabitation was prevalent neither in
1970 nor 1995, which justified treating only the legally married households as the married.
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However, if we want to study the change in housing variables in more recent periods,
it is inevitable to consider the housing price boom, bust, and recovery. Over these periods,
there have also been major changes in credit constraints, wages, and households’ beliefs
on future housing prices. The main analysis of this section is on whether the likelihood
of marital transitions plays a role in explaining housing decisions over time, considering
several factors that characterize the recent experiences in the housing market. Also, as
cohabitation has become more common these days, it is worth looking at whether there
is any difference between legally married households and cohabiting couples in terms
of housing decisions. The last subsection serves as a robustness check by categorizing
cohabiting couples as married households.
2.5.1 Major changes over time
(1) Marital transition probabilities
Figure 11 overlays the marriage and divorce probabilities in 2007 on those in both 1970
and 1995. The marriage probabilities for young singles in their 20s or 30s continued to fall.
In addition, the divorce probabilities fell for young singles. From 1995 to 2007, marital tran-
sition probabilities moved in the same direction. This is opposite of that which happened
between 1970 and 1995; marriage probabilities fell while divorce probabilities increased.
For the subsequent analysis, I assume that the marriage and divorce probabilities for the
year 2007 and those for the years after 2007 are the same.
(2) Housing prices and beliefs on price appreciation
This paper considers the housing prices to be exogenous, which does not analyze what
drives the substantial price changes over time. To make housing prices vary, I use the
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Marriage Probabilities Divorce Probabilities
Figure 11: Marriage and Divorce Probabilities
three-point process PHt = P
H × zt , as described in Section 2.3, which is similar to Corbae
and Quintin (2015) in which
zt ∈ [0.7, 1.0, 1.3], ΠPH =

0.75 0.25 0
0.045 0.91 0.045
0 0.375 0.625
 .
Let’s first look at the life-cycle profiles of homeownership rates from applying the
shock above. Starting from the steady state of 1995, I feed in the house price series so
that the highest price hits the economy only in 2005. The blue dotted lines in Figure 12
are obtained in the model period 2005.20 The model cannot simulate households to own
more housing while facing the more expensive price. The homeownership rates of both
the single and the married are much lower compared to what is observed in the 2007
data. Since housing prices are at their highest levels, they are expected to fall. Hence,
households do not invest in housing assets unless they expect the asset price to rise more.
20. When I conduct an analysis with (simulated) housing asset share, the results are qualitatively similar.
Hence, the results with homeownership rates are reported.
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Single Married
Figure 12: Homeownership at the House Price Boom (Data vs. Model)
Note: The black lines are drawn with the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances data, which represents
the housing price boom. The blue lines are obtained from the model by applying the stochastic
house price shock as follows: starting from the steady state of 1995, the house price series is fed so
that the highest price hits the economy in 10 years. The blue lines stand for the homeownership at
this boom period.
Hence, I model that households could expect house price appreciation while facing a
higher house price in a similar vein to Kaplan et al. (2017). Specifically, I incorporate an
additional shock of households’ beliefs on house price appreciation. Belief shock of future
appreciation ot is modeled as the two-state process where ot ∈ {0, e = 0.6}.21 With this
additional shock, the future house price is expected to be PHt+1 × (1 + ot+1). The transition
matrix of ot is set to be
Πo ≡
pi00 pi0e
pie0 piee
 =
0.85 0.15
0.5 0.5
 .
21. The value of e is consistent with Case et al. (2012), where survey expectations on annual housing price
growth are reported to be between 6 and 15 percent in four metropolitan areas. e = 0.6 is translated as 12
percent increase per annum.
51
In other words, given ot = 0, households expect the future price to be
PHt+1 with probability 0.85
PHt+1 × (1 + e) with probability 0.15.
Households are not likely to be optimistic about additional future price appreciation.
The expected duration of not being optimistic is about 30 years.
On the other hand, given ot = e, households expect the future price to be

PHt+1 with probability 0.5
PHt+1 × (1 + e) with probability 0.5.
Once a household becomes optimistic, that is ot = e, then the household expects future
price appreciation PHt+1 × (1 + e) with a half probability. The expected duration of being
optimistic is 10 years, which is close to the length of the recent housing boom-bust episode
in the 2000s. Physical environment at period t such as budget constraint does not change
with ot. All the change lies in the expectation about the future house price.
Given this additional shock, I define a new state variable τt ≡ (PHt , ot). This augmented
shock τt can take 6 possible values. τt ∈ {(pH1 , 0), (pH1 , e), (pH2 , 0), (pH2 , e), (pH3 , 0), (pH3 , e)} ≡
{τ1,0, τ1,e, τ2,0, τ2,e, τ3,0, τ3,e}. The transition matrix is
Πτ = ΠPH ⊗Πo =

0.75 0.25 0.0
0.045 0.91 0.045
0.0 0.375 0.625
⊗
0.85 0.15
0.5 0.5
 =

0.638 0.113 0.213 0.038 0 0
0.375 0.375 0.125 0.125 0 0
0.038 0.007 0.774 0.137 0.038 0.007
0.023 0.023 0.455 0.455 0.023 0.023
0 0 0.319 0.056 0.531 0.094
0 0 0.188 0.188 0.313 0.313

.
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I extend the previous model with an additional state τt and its transition matrix Πτ.
The expected value should be carefully computed, taking into account the stochastic nature
of τt+1 given τt. I apply the sequence of shocks (PHt , ot) in Table 8. There is empirical
evidence such as Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) and Landvoigt (2017) supporting the
optimistic beliefs of households for house price appreciation. I set the belief shock to hit
both 2000 and 2005, whereas the highest house price shock hit 2005 only. Standing at the
baseline year 1995, the ex-ante probability of this particular realization of shocks is close
to 0.05%. In this regard, this simulation represents a tail event similar to the boom-bust
episode of the 2000s.
(3) Wage and credit constraints
In addition to the change in housing prices and households’ beliefs, I consider the
simultaneous change in wages and credit constraints during the boom as in Kaplan et al.
(2017). I set the wage to be 7% higher in both 2000 and 2005 compared to the baseline
wage in 1995. This change is similar to the change observed in the median weekly real
earnings for wage and salary workers.22 The 7% wage increase is a little smaller than the
change in average male wage reported in Heathcote et al. (2010), which is about a 10%
increase.
For credit constraints, I consider the following changes. First of all, the downpayment
constraint is relaxed by changing (1− η) to be 0.15 in 2005 compared to 0.25 in 1995. Then
the value for 2000 is taken to be 0.2, the average of the two. Second, the borrowing interest
rate rH is reduced to be 0.05 per annum and the savings interest rate r is set to be 0.015 in
2005. The values for 2000 are again taken to be the average of the 1995 value and the 2005
value. This change is consistent with the decrease in the fixed rate for a 30-year mortgage
and the decrease in the net interest margin.
22. This is based on LES1252881600Q series from the FRED.
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Changes 1995 2000 2005 2010
Housing price shock PHt p
H
2 p
H
2 p
H
3 p
H
2
Belief shock of appreciation ot 0 e e 0
Wage w 1.0 1.07 1.07 1.0
Downpayment constraint (1− η) 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.25
Borrowing interest rate rH 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07
Savings interest rate r 0.02 0.018 0.015 0.02
Likelihood of marital transitions baseline marriage ↓, divorce ↓
Table 8: The Sequence of Changes Over Time
Note: pH2 is the middle house price and p
H
3 is the high house price. The wage is normalized so that
the value in 1995 is 1.0. The interest rates are reported in annual terms.
2.5.2 The effect of each channel: during boom
Single Married
Figure 13: The Effect of Each Channel on Homeownership (During Boom)
Note: The black lines are drawn with the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances data, which represents
the housing price boom. The other lines are obtained by applying the sequence of changes over
time as in Table 8.
The blue lines in Figure 13 (identical to Figure 12) show that the change in housing
prices alone is insufficient to generate the homeownership increase observed in the data
for both the single and the married.
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(1) Marital transition probabilities
The pink lines are obtained by changing the probabilities of marriage and divorce to
be the 2007 values as in Figure 11. The marriage probabilities continued to fall for the
young households and so did the divorce probabilities. As the singles are less likely to get
married, their homeownership rate increases. The average homeownership rate from age
25 to 44 increases by 6.8%. As seen in Figure 13, the effect of marital transitions is larger
for younger singles. To be specific, there is about a 20% increase for the age group of 25-29
years and a 5% increase for 30-34 years. Hence, this channel contributes to narrow the gap
between the baseline and the 2007 data for young singles.
On the other hand, the marrieds’ homeownership rate decreases with the decrease
in divorce probabilities. The reduced precautionary savings motive exerts downward
pressure on married couples to decrease their homeownership. There is about a 3%
decrease in the average homeownership from 25 to 44 years. The recent marital transition
probabilities slightly widen the gap between the baseline and the 2007 data for married
households.
(2) Wage and credit constraints
The cyan line in Figure 13 is obtained by changing wage and credit constraints as in
Table 8. With these changes, the homeownership rate increases. The following numbers
show the change in percentage of homeownership rate for each age group; the cyan lines
are compared with the pink lines from applying the recent marital transition probabilities.
The first number is for 25-29 years and the last one is for 40-44 years.
For the single: +10.9%, +9.3%, +2.3%, +2.4%
For the married: +32.9%, +14.3%, +12.2%, +9.2%
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The higher wage and the relaxed credit constraints (lower interest rates, lower down-
payment requirements) induce homeownership to increase for both singles and married
households, the increase in percentage for the latter being much bigger. As married
households are more likely to buy a house with the joint asset and labor income compared
to singles, they react more strongly once the conditions are improved to make housing
affordable. Although better wage and credit constraints increase the homeownership rate,
they are still insufficient to match the homeownership rate in the 2007 data.
(3) Belief on house price appreciation
Lastly, I add the shock on beliefs about future price appreciation. When doing so, the
homeownership rate becomes similar in level to what is observed in the real-world data. It
is worth noting that it is not only the effect of optimism on price appreciation. Without the
wage increase and the lax credit constraints, the increase in homeownership from mere
optimism is much smaller than the red lines in Figure 13. Thus, to enable households
to afford more housing, we need beliefs about housing price appreciation in addition to
changes in labor income and borrowing capacity. A similar point is also made in Kaplan
et al. (2017).
To sum up, although the magnitude of change is smaller compared to that in the past
(1970 vs. 1995), the change in likelihood of marital transitions still increases homeownership
among the single and decreases homeownership among the married. However, the
unprecedented changes in wages, credit constraints, and beliefs of appreciation, coupled
with a boom in housing prices, played a tremendous role in generating a surge in the
homeownership rate. For the married, these changes during the boom seemed to mask the
trend of decreasing homeownership rates induced by the marital transitions. In contrast,
the change in marriage probabilities contributes to replicate the homeownership increase
for young singles even when the housing prices were expensive.
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2.5.3 Homeownership over recent years
So far, I have shown that my model can generate the changes in homeownership during
the boom with the associated changes in prices, credit constraints, and beliefs on housing
price increase. In this subsection, I look at the periods after the boom-bust episode when
the real house price became similar to 1995’s level again. Figure 14 shows the time series
of real home price index. For the recovery periods (2010 and 2013),23 the house price is
set to be back to the middle value pH2 . In addition, all the other parameters are set to be
1995’s values except for the marriage and divorce probabilities.
Figure 14: Real Home Price Index in the Recent Years
Note: The real home price index is the US Standard & Poors/Case-Shiller index. This figure is taken from
Corbae and Quintin (2015).
Figure 15 shows the life-cycle profiles of homeownership over time from the data and
from the model simulation. The upper panels are obtained from the data. In 2007, a period
representative of the housing price boom, the married households’ homeownership rate
was higher compared to the benchmark year 1995. The increase in homeownership is not
so conspicuous for singles except for one age group (30-34 years). Following Glover et al.
23. The most recent data available is the 2016 SCF. But I do not include this period because the real home
price index seems to show another increasing trend.
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(2017), I treat the average life-cycle profiles of 2010 and 2013 as representing the recovery
periods after the bust. During the recovery periods, the homeownership rate of married
households is even lower than 1995, especially for those in their 20s. But for singles of the
same age group, the fall in homeownership rate is not observed.
Single: Data Married: Data
Single: Model Married: Model
Figure 15: Homeownership Over Time (Data vs. Model)
The bottom panels are obtained by the simulation applying the changes in Table 8. The
red dashed lines are from the model period 2005 and the blue dotted lines are from the
model period 2010. From the simulation, the only difference between 1995 (the baseline
58
year) and 2010 lies in marriage and divorce probabilities. For the married households, the
homeownership rate decreases as marriage and divorce become less likely. This direction
of change is consistent with what we observe in the data. If there were only the change in
marital transition probabilities, the homeownership of married households would have
been decreasing over time. However, with the other changes associated with surging
housing prices, the homeownership rate increased significantly during the boom. For
single households, the model generates a slight increase in homeownership in the recovery
period compared to 1995. As young singles are less likely to get married, they purchase
housing instead of waiting until they get married. In the data representing the recovery
period, the homeownership rate of singles aged 25 to 34 did not fall, which is in contrast
to the decrease in ownership for those aged 35 and older. This may be due to the upward
pressure resulting from the reduced marriage probabilities.
Married Single
Period Data Model Data Model
1995 0.72 0.70 0.42 0.41
Mid 2000s 0.78 0.78 0.45 0.44
2010 0.68 0.68 0.40 0.44
Table 9: The Average Homeownership Rate Over Time (Average of 25-44 Years)
Table 9 summarizes the average homeownership rate over time, focusing on the
households aged 25-44 years old. For married households, the over-time change in
homeownership from the model tracks with the patterns from the data well. The change
in the likelihood of marriage and divorce helps replicate the decreasing homeownership
among the young married households. But the changes during the boom (mid 2000s) seem
to have masked this decreasing trend in homeownership.
For singles, the model is able to generate the increase in homeownership from 1995
to the mid 2000s. But the model predicts that the homeownership rate will maintain the
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same average in 2010, which is inconsistent with the decrease observed in the data. There
may be other factors that exert a downward force on singles’ homeownership rate during
the recovery period. One potential factor could be the heightened fear of unemployment,
as pointed out in Den Haan et al. (2015). This fear would repress the desire to spend or to
save in an illiquid asset, leading to a lower homeownership rate. This remains a question
for future research.
2.5.4 Robustness check: cohabitation
The rate of cohabitation more than doubled between 1995 and 2010. According to the
Current Population Survey, 7% of adults of age 30-44 cohabited in 2010 compared to 3%
who did so in 1995. In all the analysis prior to this subsection, only the legally-married
households are considered to be married. The concern is whether legal marriage in
recent years is mere labeling; if legally married households and cohabiting couples are
qualitatively similar in terms of housing decisions, it might be misleading to categorize
cohabiting couples as single households. In the following subsections, I look at the two
data sources with the information on cohabitation and see whether the previous analysis
is still robust regardless of how cohabiting couples are categorized.
(1) From SCF data
Figure 16 shows the homeownership rate for married households, where “being
married” is differently defined. In the left panel, I only treat a household with a legal
spouse as the married household.24 In the right panel, I also treat a household who lives
with a partner as being married. As cohabitation has become prevalent since the 2000s,
it is useful to look at whether there is a significant difference between legally married
households and cohabitors in terms of homeownership. It is shown that the marrieds’
24. Singles’ homeownership rate figures are similar with or without cohabitors, hence they are omitted.
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Without Cohabitors (Previous Analysis) With Cohabitors
Figure 16: The Marrieds’ Homeownership With and Without Cohabitors
Note: The line for 1995 data is drawn with legally married households only — the same baseline to
help comparison.
homeownership rate becomes lower once we include cohabitors to the married category.
This may result from the fact that a household’s ability to buy a house is quite different
between the married and the cohabitors. For example, a married household can own a
house together, both of them being on the deed, and sign a joint mortgage contract with
tax benefits. However, these options are not legally permitted for cohabiting couples.
Furthermore, we can compare how the homeownership rate differs depending on
how to categorize cohabitors given a specific year. The average homeownership for 2007
becomes 5.6% lower if we regard cohabitors as married. In addition, the average home-
ownership rate for the recovery period becomes 7% lower. This could be due to the fact
that there are more cohabiting couples in the economy. This composition change of in-
creasing cohabitors puts a downward force on the average homeownership rate if they are
categorized as married. It is worth noting that the over-time trend in homeownership rate
is qualitatively similar regardless of how to categorize cohabitors. Despite the difference
in the magnitude of change, the average homeownership rate increased during the boom
and then fell during the recovery period. Hence, my analysis of tracking this over-time
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pattern is still valid regardless of how to label those who cohabitate.
Figure 17: The Fraction of Cohabitors in Each Age Group
(2) From PSID data
In this subsection, I look at the marriage and divorce probabilities depending on how
cohabitors are categorized. In the PSID data, there are two variables related to marital
status. Taking the 2007 PSID as an example, variable ER36023 asks the legal marital status
whereas ER41039 asks marital status where no distinction is made between those legally
married and those who merely cohabitate. I construct the age-dependent marriage and
divorce probabilities using these two different variables.
The top panels in Figure 18 show the marriage and divorce probabilities depending on
how to categorize cohabitors. The divorce probabilities become higher once we include
cohabitors among the married. So we can see that the young cohabitors are more likely
to separate than the legally married. The marriage probabilities become lower once we
include cohabitors. This indicates that the transition from single to either married or
cohabiting is less likely than the one from single or cohabiting to married. The bottom
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Marriage Probabilities Divorce Probabilities
Figure 18: Marriage and Divorce Probabilities with and without Cohabitors
panels show how the likelihood of marital transitions changed over time. The black lines
are based on labeling only the legally married as married households. The blue dashed
lines are from adding cohabitors to the married category. Regardless of the categorization,
the recent trend of falling marriage and divorce probabilities is kept.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
Owner-occupied housing is the most widely held assets and an important source of
individual and national wealth. Many countries have attempted to boost home purchasing
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by implementing policies such as mortgage subsidies and tax benefits. To assess the
effectiveness of such policies, it is crucial to study the drivers for households’ housing
decisions. This paper argues that the evolving likelihood of marriage and divorce is an
essential factor in accounting for how housing decisions have changed in the United States.
I first look at two years — 1970 and 1995 — when the real house prices were similar in
level but the marriage and divorce probabilities differed substantially. Comparing these
two years, the micro data shows that the singles’ homeownership increased for all age
groups and the young marrieds’ housing asset share decreased. I conjecture that these
changes in housing variables could be affected by the change in the likelihood of marital
transitions. A single who is likely to get married soon will wait to buy a house with a
spouse because it is costly to sell or resize a house. Furthermore, the prospect of marriage
creates a free rider problem that discourages singles from saving, which makes it unlikely
for them to be homeowners. For a married couple, a high probability of divorce will
prevent them from investing in housing because it is more difficult to split a house than
liquid assets.
To quantify what fraction of the observed change in homeownership and housing asset
share can be explained by the change in marital transitions, I build a life-cycle model
of single and married households that face exogenous age-dependent marital transition
shocks. In times of getting married or divorced, a substantial transaction cost is modeled
to arise because housing is a highly idiosyncratic investment, and a marital status change
would make the house owned prior to the change no longer suitable. In addition, the
model includes the features to incorporate the changes in borrowing constraints, earnings
risk, and spousal productivity.
I estimate the parameters of the model by a limited information Bayesian method
to match the moments from 1995’s cross-section data. Then I conduct a decomposition
analysis comparing 1970 to 1995 as two steady states with different marriage and divorce
probabilities. I find that the change in the likelihood of marital transitions accounts for 29%
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of the increase in the homeownership rate of singles. This fraction is substantial given that
the changes in downpayment requirements, earnings risk, and spousal labor productivity
jointly replicate 45% of the change. Furthermore, the model can only reproduce the
decline in housing asset share if the changes in marital transitions are included. In their
absence, the other drivers predict an increase in this share, again demonstrating the crucial
importance of this channel for observed trends in households’ housing decisions.
I then extend my analysis to study whether the ongoing change in marital transitions
still plays a role in explaining housing decisions in recent years. To do so, one must
inevitably incorporate the dramatically changing house prices as seen in the boom-bust
episode of the 2000s. Hence, I simulate the homeownership rates with the changes in
marital transitions, house prices, beliefs on appreciation, credit constraints, and wages.
These changes are set to mimic the recent experiences in the housing market. The decrease
in both marriage and divorce probabilities increases the singles’ homeownership rate by
6.8%, but it decreases the marrieds’ homeownership rate by 3.2%. The changes in credit
constraints, wages, and beliefs on appreciation were often suggested as drivers for the
homeownership increase during the boom, which is also supported by my paper. It is worth
noting that the change in marital transitions contributes to replicate the homeownership
increase for young singles even when housing prices were expensive.
This paper sheds light on how underlying demographic changes have shaped house-
holds’ housing decisions, which could be of interest to policymakers. For instance, the
Trump administration suggested a new tax law that will reduce the number of people
who can claim the mortgage interest deduction. This policy may have very different
impacts across households depending on their marital stability and their risk of a status
change. Also, the trend of decreasing marriages puts upward pressure to the singles’
homeownership. As a result, the change in mortgage interest deductability may be more
detrimental to singles than it is intended to be.
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Lastly, since marital transitions and housing decisions are complex problems in life,
my model abstracts from some interesting dimensions to explore, including strategic
interactions within marriage. In other words, my model is a measurement device to see
how much the likelihood of marital transitions account for the change in housing decisions
while ruling out disagreement between married spouses. As a first pass, this model is still
meaningful to account for the increase in the singles’ homeownership and the decrease in
the marrieds’ housing asset share. How these within-group changes in housing decisions
are affected by the prospect of marriage and divorce has not been quantified in the
literature. However, the current model is not sufficient to study, for example, how divorced
males and females differ in their decisions and outlooks and how these discrepancies
affect the joint decision during the marriage. Incorporating intra-household bargaining or
collective decision making would be an interesting avenue for future research.
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Chapter 3
Heterogeneity and Aggregate
Fluctuations
25
Models with heterogeneity on the household side or the firm side have long been used
to study distributional effects of macroeconomic policies. Heterogeneity evolves dynam-
ically and in some of these models interacts closely with aggregate fluctuations. This
is particularly true in models with financing constraints that try to capture the large
downturn during the recent Great Recession. While the macroeconomics literature has
demonstrated that dynamics in heterogeneous agent (HA) models can be different from
their representative agent (RA) counterparts, it is an open question whether in the data
there is strong evidence that the dynamics of macroeconomic aggregates interacts, at
business cycle frequencies, with the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution of income
and wealth on the household side and the distribution of productivity and capital on the
firm side.
The goal of this paper is to develop and apply econometric tools that can provide
semi-structural evidence about the interaction of aggregate and distributional dynamics.
25. This chapter is a joint work with Xiaohong Chen and Frank Schorfheide.
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More specifically, we specify a state-space model with a state-transition equation that takes
the form of a functional vector autoregression (VAR) and stacks macroeconomic aggregates
and cross-sectional distributions. We motivate the specification of our functional state-
space model by a linearization of a reduced form model in which dynamics of aggregate
variables and a function of the lagged cross-sectional distribution of individual-level
decisions or states, and the units (households or firms) base their decisions on lagged
macroeconomic aggregates and lagged cross-sectional distributions. To make the functional
analysis tractable, we approximate the log-densities of the cross-sectional distributions as
well as the transition kernels in the functional autoregressive law of motion of the states
by sieves. This leads to a finite-dimensional approximation that is expressed in terms of
the aggregate variables as well as the coefficients of the sieve approximations.
The functional analysis is implemented with spline basis functions. Log-splines are a
popular tool in the statistics literature to approximate densities non-parametrically. In a
first step, we estimate the coefficients of the log-spline density approximation for each time
period based on a finite sample of cross-sectional observations. We treat these coefficients
as noisy measures of a finite-dimensional population approximation of the cross-sectional
densities. The measurement errors capture the estimation uncertainty associated with the
log-spline coefficients. We then construct an approximate state-space model that stacks
the latent population spline coefficients and the macroeconomic variables in a vector of
state variables that evolves according to a linear vector autoregressive law of motion. The
coefficients of this state-space model are estimated using Bayesian techniques and the
subsequent substantive analysis is based on the estimated state-space model.
This paper makes several contributions. First, we develop a Bayesian implementation
of the estimation procedure. Our procedure is able to account for estimation errors in
the cross-sectional densities. We also allow for seasonal adjustments of the cross-sectional
densities if they are combined with seasonally-adjusted aggregate data. Prior distributions
are used to regularize a potentially high-dimensional estimation problem. Second, we
68
make an empirical contribution, by documenting the effect of technology shocks on the
cross-sectional distribution of income as well as the effect of distributional shocks that
raise inequality on macroeconomic aggregates. Third, an expanded future version of this
paper will provide a large sample theory for our estimation procedure. We will provide
convergence rates for estimators under the assumption that the number of draws from
period t cross-sectional distributions, N, the number of time periods, T, and the number
of terms in the sieve approximations of the cross-sectional densities, K, tend to infinity.
Using mostly calibrated HA models, the quantitative macro literature has been ex-
amining three types of research questions related to distributional dynamics. First, does
micro-level heterogeneity affect the propagation of aggregate shocks to aggregate vari-
ables? Second, what is the effect of an aggregate shock on cross-sectional distributions?
Third, what is the effect of a change in the cross-sectional distribution on macroeconomic
aggregates?
A seminal paper assessing the first question is Krusell and Smith (1998), henceforth KS.
The paper combines a neoclassical stochastic growth model with a heterogeneous agent
economy in which households face uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk. The equilibrium
in the KS model has exactly the features described above: households’ decisions depend
on the aggregate technology shock as well as the cross-sectional distribution of skills and
wealth. In turn, the entirety of the household-level decisions determine the cross-sectional
distribution. One of the key findings was that in the stationary stochastic equilibrium, the
behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates can be almost perfectly described using only
the mean of the wealth distribution.
In extensions of the benchmark model, this approximate aggregation result is no longer
true and these models exhibit a richer interaction between aggregate and distributional
dynamics. For instance, Chang et al. (2013) consider a HA model with indivisible labor
supply. According to their findings, it is important to include a labor supply shock in
the RA model to approximate the dynamics of the HA economy well. This aggregate
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labor supply shock essentially captures time-varying aggregation errors. Their simulation
results imply that modeling the dynamics of cross-sections is not of first-order importance
if the analysis focuses on macroeconomic aggregates. However, there is an important
caveat: preference and technology parameter estimates of the RA model are not invariant
to policy changes and the bias in the RA models policy predictions is large compared to
predictive intervals that reflect parameter uncertainty.
A popular tool to study whether micro-level heterogeneity affects the propagation of
aggregate shocks at the macro level is a comparison of impulse responses from a models
with and without micro-level heterogeneity that share an otherwise identication structure.
Recent examples of this work include Ottonello and Winberry (2018) as well as Ahn et al.
(2018) and Kaplan and Violante (2018). The second research question, that is, the effect
of aggregate shocks on cross-sectional distributions, has been analyzed in a number of
recent papers. For instance, the abovementioned paper by Ahn et al. (2018) also studies the
effect of factor-specific productivity shocks on inequality dynamics. Coibion et al. (2017)
and Kaplan and Violante (2018) examine the distributional effects of monetary policy
shocks. Mongey and Williams (2017) analyze the effect of macro shocks on the dispersion
of sales growth. Finally, an example of research examinig the third question is the paper
by Auclert and Rognlie (2018) which studies the effect of an exogenous rise in equality on
macroeconomic dynamics.
In our functional state-space framework, after applying suitable identification schemes,
we are able to construct impulse responses of cross-sectional distributions to aggregate
shocks as well as responses of aggregate variables to shocks that primarily move the
cross-sectional distribution. Moreover, we can assess the significance of the coefficients
that capture spill-overs from lagged distributional coefficients to current macroeconomic
variables and, vice versa, from lagged macroeconomic variables to the current cross-
sectional distribution. If the VAR coefficients in the state-transition equation are block-
diagonal, then there is no benefit from modeling the the cross-sectional heterogeneity if the
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goal is to understand aggregate dynamics. Thus, the methods developed in this paper allow
researchers to examine the three abovementioned question in a semi-structural framework
that does not require the solution and calibration or estimation of a heterogeneous agent
model.
There is an extensive literature on the statistical analysis of functional data. General
treatments are provided in the books by Bosq (2000), Ramsey and Silverman (2005), and
Horvath and Kokoszka (2012). Much of the literature assumes that the functions are
observed without error. Examples of such functions are the reading of a thermometer over
the span of twenty-four hours or the price of a stock from opening to closing time of a
stock exchange. Each day delivers a new observation of the curve. In our application, the
functions are a log probability densities, which are not observed, but can be estimated from
cross-sectional observations. A fundamental model in the functional time series literature
is the functional autoregressive model of order one. Bosq (2000) provides a detailed
analysis of this model as well as more general functional linear processes. Functional
autoregressive models can be estimated by functional principal component analysis, which
approximates the functions by linear combinations of the eigenfunctions of the sample
covariance operator associated with the K largest eigenvalues. Rather than using what the
literature considers to be an optimal (in a least squares sense) empirical orthonormal basis,
we use a spline basis that is chosen independently of the data.
Applications of functional data analysis in macroeconometrics are rare. The state-space
model Diebold and Li (2006) could be interpreted as a functional model for yield-curve
data, but there is no infinite-dimensional aspect to the analysis in the sense that it is
assumed (and empirically justified) that the yield-curves can be represented by three
time-varying parameters. Inoue and Rossi (2018) estimate what they call a VAR with
functional shocks, which uses a similar representation of the yield curve as in Diebold
and Li (2006) and focuses on the identification of a functional monetary policy. The
paper imposes restrictions of the evolution of the yield curves and abstracts from the
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nonparametric aspects of functional modeling. Hu and Park (2017) develop an estimation
theory for a functional autoregressive model with unit roots and fit it to yield curve data
and Chang et al. (2016) use a functional time series process to capture the evolution of
earnings densities with a focus on unit-root components. Both papers use functional
principal components analysis.
Both our functional VAR analysis as well as the solution of models with heterogeneous
agents requires a parsimonious representation of cross-sectional distributions. For instance,
Krusell and Smith (1998) represent the wealth distribution by its mean. Reiter (2010) uses
a discretization of the wealth distribution and a Markov transition matrix to characterize
movements in the wealth distribution. The transition probabilities are functions of the
aggregate states. Algan et al. (2008) and Winberry (2018) use moments to characterize
the distribution of productivity and capital. From these moments, it is then possible to
recover a density with a class of distributions that belong to the exponential family.26
Childers (2015) considers linearization methods for models with function-valued states,
using a wavelet representation. These approximations can be interpreted as sieves with
different types of basis functions. Our analysis uses spline basis functions to approximate
log densities, which dates back to Kooperberg and Stone (1990).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.1 we outline a
functional state-space model for a group of macroeconomic time series and a sequence of
cross-sectional distributions that are estimated based on cross-sectional data. We estimate
the functional state-space model using Bayesian techniques. Implementation details such
as the choice of basis functions, the choice of prior distributions, and the posterior sampler
are discussed in Section 3.2. The empirical application is presented in Section 3.4 and
Section 3.5 concludes. Supplemental derivations and information about the empirical
analysis are relegated to the Online Appendix.
26. This approach is somewhat related to the density estimator discussed in Efron and Tibshirani (1996).
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3.1 A Functional State Space Model – Heuristics
VARs can be viewed as approximations to the equilibrium dynamics arising from lin-
earized RA models and have proved to be useful for the evaluation and development of
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Moreover, VARs are widely used
in empirical macroeconomics independently of DSGE models, to study business cycle
fluctations, the propagation of shocks, and to generate macroeconomic foreasts. In this
paper, we develop a functional vector autoregression (fVAR) that is embedded in a state
space model and can play a similar role as traditional VARs in environments in which
macroeconomic aggregates interact with cross-sectional distributions. While we not will
establish a formal link between our functional model and the solution of HA models, it
does capture the salient features and provides a natural reference model for the evaluation
of HA models. Moreover, just as VARs, our functional model can be used as a stand-alone
tool for empirical work in macroeconomics.
In this section we provide an informal presentation of the functional model. A formal
treatment is relegated to Section 3.5. The variables in the model comprise an nz × 1 vector
of macroeconomic aggregates Zt and a cross-sectional density pt(x). In our application
Zt consists of (log) total factor productivity growth, per-capita GDP growth, and the log
employment rate. The cross-sectional variable x is earnings as a fraction of per-capita GDP.
Throughout this paper, we will work with log densities defined as `t(x) = ln pt(x). We
decompose Zt and `t into a deterministic component (Z∗, `∗(x)) and fluctuations around
the deterministic component. Let
Zt = Z∗ + Z˜t, `t = `∗ + ˜`t. (1)
For notational convenience we assumed that the deterministic component is time-invariant
and could be interpreted as a steady state. This assumption could be easily relaxed
by letting (Z∗, `∗) depend on t. We assume that the deviations from the deterministic
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component (Z˜t, ˜`t(x)) evolve jointly according to the following linear functional VAR law
of motion:
Z˜t = BzzZ˜t−1 +
∫
Bzl(x˜)˜`t−1(x˜)dx˜ + uz,t (2)
˜`t(x) = Blz(x)Z˜t−1 +
∫
Bll(x, x˜)˜`t−1(x˜)dx˜ + ul,t(x).
Here uz,t is mean-zero random vector with covariance Σzz and ul,t(x) is a random element
in L2 with covariance function Σll(x, x˜). We denote the covariance function for uz,t and
ul,t(x) by Σzl(x).
To condense the notation, we define integral operators with kernels Bzl(x˜) and Bll(x, x˜)
as
Bzl[g] =
∫
Bzl(x˜)g(x˜)dx˜, Bll[g](x) =
∫
Bll(x, x˜)g(x˜)dx˜.
Using the operator notation, we can write (2) more compactly as
Z˜t = BzzZ˜t−1 +Bzl[˜`t−1] + uz,t (3)
˜`t(x) = Blz(x)Z˜t−1 +Bll[˜`t−1](x) + ul,t(x).
For now, (3) should be interpreted as a reduced-form fVAR in which uz,t and ul,t(x) are
one-step-ahead forecast errors. In principle we could add further lags, but our empirical
analysis will be based on a single lag. The system will subsequently serve as the state-
transition equation in a functional state-space model.
3.1.1 Sampling and Measurement Equation
We assume that in every period t = 1, . . . , T the econometrician observes a measurement
of the macroeconomic aggregates Zot (here the o superscript indicates “observed”) as well
as a sample of Nt draws xoit, i = 1, . . . , Nt from the cross-sectional density pt(x). In practice,
Nt is likely to vary from period to period, but for the subsequent exposition it will be
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more convenient to assume that Nt = N for all t. We also assume that the draws xoit are
independently and identically distributed (iid) over the cross-section as well as over time.
The measurement equations take the form
Zot = Z∗ + Z˜t (4)
xoit ∼ iid pt(x) =
exp{`∗(x) + ˜`t(x)}∫
exp{`∗(x) + ˜`t(x)}dx
, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T. (5)
Here we assumed that the macroeconomic aggregates are observed without errors and
have been transformed to have time-invariant mean/steady state Z∗. The assumption of xit
being iid across i and t is consistent with data sets that comprise repeated cross sections.27
It is also approximately consistent with panel data sets if the unit index i is randomly
re-assigned in every period t. Thus, to the extent that the cross-sectional densities pt(x)
are estimated from a panel data set, there is some potential loss of information in our
functional modeling approach. However, on the positive side, the functional modeling
approach does not require the econometrician to make assumptions about the evolution of
xit at the level of an individual, a household, or a firm.
3.1.2 Sieve Approximations
Equations (3), (4), and (5) define a state-space model for the observables {Zot , xo1,t, . . . , xo2,t}Tt=1.
The state variables are (Z˜t, l˜t). To implement the estimation of the functional model we
approximate infinite-dimensional elements by sieves. We will formalize the nature of the
approximation in Section 3.5. Let
˜`t(x) ≈ ˜`(K)t (x) =
K
∑
k=0
α˜k,tζk(x) = [ζ0(x), ζ1(x), . . . , ζK(x)] ·

α˜0,t
...
α˜K,t
 = ζt(x)α˜t (6)
27. If the data exhibit spatial correlation, then our estimation approach below essentially replaces the likelihood
function for xo1t , . . . , x
o
Nt by a composite likelihood function that ignores the spatial correlation; see ?.
75
and
`∗(x) ≈ `(K)∗ (x) = ζ(x)α∗.
Here ζ0(x), ζ1(x), . . . is a sequence of basis functions. We let αt = α∗ + α˜t such that `(K)(x) =
`(K)∗ (x) + ˜`t(x). Moreover, we adopt the convention that ζ0(x) = 1 such that α0,t becomes the
normalization constant for the density pt(x).
To approximate the measurement equation of the cross-sectional observations in (5),
we let Xot = [x
o
1t, . . . , x
o
Nt] and define the K-dimensional vector of sufficient statistics
ζ¯(Xot ) =
N
∑
i=1
ζ(xoit).
This allows us to write a K’th order approximation to the density of Xot :
p(K) (Xot |αot ) = exp
{
ζ¯(Xot )α
o
t
}
(7)
where αo0,t = − ln
∫
exp
{
K
∑
k=1
αok,tζk(x)
}
dx
αok,t = αk,∗ + α˜k,t, k = 1, . . . ,K.
We introduced the auxiliary coefficients αok,t to capture the re-normalization, which is
determined outside of the state-transition equation (see below) that will govern the
evolution of αt.
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For the state-transition equation (3) we approximate the kernels Bzl(x˜) and Bll(x, x˜), the
function Blz(x), and the functional innovation ul,t(x) as follows:
Bzl(x˜) ≈ B(K)zl (x) =
J
∑
j=0
Bzl,.jξ j(x˜) = Bzlξ ′(x˜) (8)
Bll(x, x˜) ≈ B(K)ll (x, x˜) =
K
∑
k=0
J
∑
j=0
Bll,kjζk(x)ξ j(x˜) = ζ(x)Bllξ ′(x˜)
Blz(x) ≈ B(K)lz (x) =
K
∑
k=0
Blz,kζk(x) = ζ(x)Blz
ul,t(x) ≈ u(K)l,t (x) =
K
∑
k=0
uαk,tζk(x)p∗(x) = ζ ′(x)ua,t.
Here ξ0(x), ξ1(x), . . . is a second sequence of basis functions and, for a given x, ξ ′(x) =
[ξ0(x), ξ1(x), . . . , ξ J(x)] is a 1× (J + 1) vector. The matrix Bzl is of dimension nz× (J + 1), Bll is
of dimension (K + 1)× (J + 1) and Blz is of dimension (K + 1)× nz. Let B(K)zl [·] and B(K)ll [·](x)
be the operators associated with the kernels B(K)zl (x) and B
(K)
ll (x, x˜). An approximation of (3)
is given by
Z˜t = BzzZ˜t−1 +B
(K)
zl [˜`
(K)
t−1] + uz,t (9)
˜`(K)
t (x) = B
(K)
lz (x)Z˜t−1 +B
(K)
ll [˜`
(K)
t−1](x) + u
(K)
l,t (x).
Combining (6), (8), and (9) yields the following vector autoregressive system for the
macroeconomic aggregates and the sieve coefficients:
 Z˜t
α˜t
 =
 Bzz BzlCα
Blz BllCα

 Z˜t−1
α˜t−1
 +
 uz,t
uα,t
 , (10)
where
Cα =
∫
ξ ′(x˜)ζ(x˜)dx˜.
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Overall, we obtain a state-space representation that comprises the measurement equa-
tions (4) and (7) and the state-transition equation (10). Due to the measurement equation
for the xits, the state-space representation is nonlinear and the computation of the exact
likelihood requires a nonlinear filter. To avoid the use of a nonlinear filter in the empirical
application, we consider the following simplification. Using (7), define the log likelihood
function and the maximum-likelihood estimator αˆot as
L(αt|Xot ) = ln p(K)(Xot |αot ), αˆot = argmaxαot L(αt|X
o
t ). (11)
Provided that the number of cross-sectional observations N is large relative to the di-
mension K, the maximum likelihood estimator has an asymptotically normal sampling
distribution, that is,
αˆot |αot
approx∼ N(αot ,Vαot ),
where Vαot is the inverse of the negative Hessian. To simplify the measurement equation
(7), we pursue a limited-information approach and condition inference about αot on αˆ
o
t :
αˆot = α∗ + α˜t + N−1/2ηt, ηt ∼ N(0,Vαˆot ). (12)
Here, the Hessian is evaluated at Vαˆot . By replacing (7) by (12) we obtain a linear Gaussian
state-space model and the likelihood function can be evaluated with the Kalman filter.
3.1.3 Relationship to Structural HA Models
In HA models, individual choices depend on the cross-sectional distribution of unit-specific
variables, e.g., wealth and skill, and on some macroeconomic state variables, e.g., total
factor productivity. As a consequence, macroeconomic variables that aggregate choices
at the micro level will also depend on cross-sectional distributions in addition to the
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macroeconomic state variables. We capture these relationships in the following, very
stylized model:
Z˜t = BzzZ˜t−1 +
∫
Bzpxpt−1(x)dx + σηt, ηt ∼ N(0, 1) (13)
xit = Bxxxit−1 +
∫
Bxpxpt−1(x)dx + BxzZ˜t−1 + eit, eit ∼ N(0, 1). (14)
Here Z˜t is scalar, pt(x) is the cross-sectional distribution of the xits, and both Z˜t and xit only
depend on the mean of the xit−1 distribution. Because this stylized model is backward-
looking, it is straightforward to characterize the law of motion for the cross-sectional
density pt(x) by integrating (14) over i:
pt(x) =
∫
φN
(
x− Bxx x˜−
∫
Bxpxpt−1(x)dx− BxzZ˜t−1
)
pt−1(x˜)dx˜, (15)
where φN(·) is the probability density function of a N(0, 1).
To cast the model into the form (2) the law of motion for pt(x) has to be linearized. The
steady state density p∗(x) is obtained by shutting down aggregate uncertainty and setting
σ = 0, which leads to the functional equation:
p∗(x) =
∫
φN (x− Bxx x˜) p∗(x˜)dx˜. (16)
The solution is given by the density of a N(0, 1/(1− Bxx)) random variable. Let `t(x) =
ln pt(x). Linearization of (15) with respect to ˜`t and Z˜t around `∗(x) = ln p∗(x) and 0 yields
˜`t(x) = − 1p∗(x)Bxz
[∫
φ(1)N (x− Bxx x˜) p∗(x˜)dx˜
]
Z˜t−1 (17)
− 1
p∗(x)
[∫
φ(1)N (x− Bxx x˜) p∗(x˜)dx˜
] ∫
Bxp x˜p∗(x˜)˜`t−1(x˜)dx˜
+
1
p∗(x)
∫
φN (x− Bxx x˜) p∗(x˜)˜`t−1(x˜)dx˜
= BlzZ˜t−1 +Bll[˜`t−1].
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Thus, in this stylized example the fVAR state-transition equation in (3) is obtained as a
linear approximation.
3.2 Implementation Details
We now provide some of the implementation details. The choice of basis functions is
described in Section 3.2.1 and some preliminary transformations of the estimated basis
function coefficients is discussed in Section 3.2.2. Section 3.2.3 provides details on the
specification of the measurement equation for the basis function coefficients and the
state-transition equation of the empirical state-space model. Piors and the computation of
posteriors for the parameters of the state-space model are discussed in Section 3.2.4 and
Section 3.2.5 explains how forecasts and impulse response functions for the basis function
coefficients can be converted back into cross-sectional densities.
3.2.1 Basis Functions
A convenient basis for the log density is a spline of degree m = 3. This connects the
analysis to log-spline density estimation; see Kooperberg and Stone (1990). A spline is a
piecewise polynomial functions with knots xs, s = 1, . . . , S:
Spl(m, S) =
m
∑
k=0
ak
(
xkI{x ≤ xS} + xkSI{x > xS}
)
+
S−1
∑
s=1
bs
(
[max{x− xs, 0}]mI{x ≤ xS} + (xS − xs)mI{x > xS}
)
+
m
∑
k=1
ck[max{x− xS, 0}]m.
Kooperberg and Stone (1990) suggest to make the function linear and upward sloping on
the interval (−∞, x1) and linear and downward sloping on the interval [xS,∞]. Thus, for
m = 3 this would lead to a2 = a1 = 0 and c2 = c3 = 0. This leads to tails of a Laplace density,
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which are a bit thicker than Gaussian tails. Translating this specification into our ζ j(x),
j = 0, . . . ,K = S + 1 notation, we obtain:
ζ0(x) = 1 (18)
ζ1(x) = (xI{x ≤ xS} + xSI{x > xS})
ζ2(x) =
(
[max{x− x1, 0}]3I{x ≤ xS} + (xS − x1)3I{x > xS}
)
...
ζS(x) =
(
[max{x− xS−1, 0}]3I{x ≤ xS} + (xS − xS−1)3I{x > xS}
)
ζS+1(x) = max{x− xS, 0}.
3.2.2 Sieve Coefficients
The first step in the estimation of the functional model is the construction of the sequence
of estimated log-spline coefficients. For each period t, we estimate a log-spline density
based on the cross-sectional data xo1t, . . . , x
o
Nt; see (11). We denote the resulting maximum
likelihood estimates by αˆok,t, k = 0, . . . ,K. We drop the sequence of coefficients, α0,t, that
simply normalize the densities.
Seasonal Adjustment. In our application xoit is based on quarterly earnings data from the
Current Population Survey (CPS). Unlike the macroeconomic variables stacked in Zot , the
quarterly earnings data are not seasonally adjusted. To seasonally adjust the cross-sectional
densities, we estimate two regressions for k = 1, . . . ,K by OLS:
Constant Mean : αˆok,t = α¯k + residual (19)
Quarterly Dummies : αˆok,t =
4
∑
q=1
sq(t)α¯q,k + residual, (20)
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where sq(t) = 1 if period t is associated with quarter q and sq(t) = 0 otherwise. For each k
we use the Schwarz information criterion (BIC) to choose between the two specifications
and then define αˆrk,t as the residual from the selected regression.
Compression. In our experience, the αˆrk,t series exhibit collinearity. We remove perfect
collinearities by expressing the coefficient series as linear combinations of a K˜× 1 vector
αˆct using principal component analysis. Here K˜ ≤ K. Let
αˆrt = Λ
′αˆct + residual, (21)
where Λ′ is a K× K˜ matrix of loadings. Now consider the following eigenvalue decompo-
sition of the sample covariance matrix of the αˆrt ’s:
Vˆ[αˆrt] =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
αˆrt αˆ
r′
t = V
′ΞV, (22)
where V is a matrix of eigenvectors and Ξ is a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues. We define
the T × K˜ matrix αˆc with rows αˆc′t where αˆc
′
t = αˆ
r′
t V.1 and V.1 collects the eigenvectors
associated with non-zero (in practice less than 10−10) eigenvalues. The loadings can be
computed as
Λˆ = (αˆc
′
αˆc)−1αˆc
′
αˆr, (23)
where αˆr is the T × K matrix with rows αˆr′t . With a cut-off value for the eigenvalues of
10−10 the estimated loadings generate essentially a perfect fit in our application. Thus, we
can use Λˆ to convert the αˆct ’s back into αˆ
r
t ’s.
82
3.2.3 State-Space Representation
Because of the seasonal adjustment procedure, the αˆck,t time series have mean zero. Thus,
we can simplify (12) to obtain the following measurement equation:
αˆct = α˜
c
t + N
−1/2ηct , ηct ∼ N(0,Vαˆct ). (24)
Note that compared to (12) the dimension of the αˆt vector has changed because of the
compression step. The covariance matrix Vcαˆt of the “measurement” errors is defined as
Vαˆct = −(ΛˆΛˆ′)−1Λˆ[H(αˆot )]−1Λˆ′(ΛˆΛˆ′)−1, (25)
where Λˆ is the estimated loading matrix in (23) and H(αˆot ) is the Hessian associated with
the original log likelihood function L(αt|Xot ) defined in (11). The Hessian depends on the
observations Xot only through αˆ
o
t .
The state transition is essentially given by (10) but we need to adjust it for the com-
pression of the αt vector. Moreover, we now absorb the matrix Cα into the matrices of
regression coefficients:
 Z˜t
α˜ct
 =
 Bzz Bczα
Bcαz Bcαα

 Z˜t−1
α˜ct−1
 +
 uz,t
uαc ,t
 . (26)
We assume that the innovations are normally distributed and write the state transition
more compactly as
wt = Φ1wt−1 + ut, ut ∼ N(0,Σ), (27)
where wt = [Z˜t, α˜ct ].
83
3.2.4 Priors and Posteriors
Prior to the estimation of the state-space model, we remove the deterministic components
from Zot and αˆ
o
t . Thus, the unknown coefficients are concentrated in the state-transition
equation (27), which takes the form of a multivariate linear Gaussian regression model.
The state transition can be expressed in matrix form as
W = ΦX +U,
where W, X, and U have rows w′t, x′t, and u′t, respectively and Φ = Φ′1. Defining φ = vec(Φ)
we use a prior distribution of the form
Σ ∼ IW(ν, S), φ|λ ∼ N(µ
φ
, P−1φ (λ)), (28)
where IW(·) is the Inverse-Wishart distribution with ν degrees of freedom and scale matrix
S.
The prior precision matrix Pφ(λ) is a function of a vector of hyperparameters λ =
[λ1, λ2, λ3]′ and takes the form
Pφ(λ) = λ1

(Σ−1)zz ⊗
 Inz 0
0 λ2 Inα
 (Σ−1)zα ⊗
 √λ3 Inz 0
0
√
λ2 Inα

(Σ−1)αz ⊗
 √λ3 Inz 0
0
√
λ2 Inα
 (Σ−1)αα ⊗
 λ3 Inz 0
0 Inα


. (29)
Here the partitions of Σ−1 conform with the partition wt = [Z˜t, α˜ct ]. The hyperparameter
λ1 controls the overall precision of the prior distribution; λ2 scales the relative precision
of the prior distribution for the coefficients that control the effect of α˜ct−1 on Z˜t; likewise,
λ3 scales the relative precision of the prior distribution for the coefficients that control
the effect of Z˜t−1 on α˜ct . Unlike the more commonly used matrix-Normal Inverse-Wishart
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prior that mimicks the Kronecker structure of the likelihood function, the prior in (28)
allows us to control the degree of spillovers from distributional dynamics to the aggregate
dynamics and vice versa. If the prior mean µ
φ
is zero, then as λ2, λ3 −→ ∞, the posterior
distributions of Bαz and Bzα concentrate around zero, which shuts down spillover effects.
Conditional on λ, it is straightforward to sample from the posterior distribution of
(φ,Σ) using a Gibbs sampler following the approach in ? that iterates over the blocks:
φ|(Σ,W1:T), Σ|(φ,W1:T) W1:T|(φ,Σ, Z˜1:T , αˆc1:T).
Here it is important to note that conditional on W1:T the observations (Z˜1:T , αˆc1:T) do not
contain any information about (φ,Σ).
3.2.5 Recovering Cross-Sectional Densities
Based on the estimated state-transition equation (26) we can generate forecasts and impulse
response functions for the compressed coefficients α˜ct . However, the dynamics of these
coefficients in itself is not particularly interesting. Thus, we have to convert them back
into densities using the following steps (which can be executed for each draw of α˜ct from
the relevant posterior distribution). First, use (24) to turn α˜ct into αˆ
c
t . If the goal is to
generate forecasts of observed cross-sectional densities then the conversion should account
for the measurement error ηct . If the goal is to generate impulse response functions for
the densities, then we recommend setting ηct equal to zero. Second, use (21) and (23) to
transform αˆct into αˆ
r
t . Third, use (19) to recover αˆ
o
k,t. If the goal is to compute impulse
responses, use as intercept the average of the seasonal dummies 14 ∑
4
q=1 α¯q,k. Forth, compute
the normalization constant αo0,t as well as the density p
(K)(Xot |αot ) according to the definition
in (7).
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3.3 Simulation
The simulation analysis illustrates what interaction between aggregate and distribution is
picked up using our methodology given the seminal Krusell-Smith economy (Krusell and
Smith (1998)).
3.3.1 Data and Model Estimation
Data. We generate the simulated data after solving the Krusell-Smith model as in Winberry
(2018). The model is solved following the three steps: first, the equilibrium distribution is
approximated using finite-dimensional approximations; second, the stationary equilibrium
of the approximated model without aggregate shock is computed; lastly, the aggregate
dynamics of the approximated model is computed using perturbation.
We simulate a yearly data set for 200 periods. Figure 1 shows the simulated aggregate
and micro data.
Figure 1: Simulated Data
Aggregate Capital Histogram of Individual Assets
Notes: Left panel: Aggregate capital series from the simulation. Right panel: Histogram of individual assets
from two different time periods (blue for period 20, and red for period 150).
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Using the coefficients and moments saved as outputs from the simulation, the proba-
bility density function of distribution of households over assets is
ge,t(a) = exp (g1e,t(a−m1e,t) +
ng
∑
i=1
gie,t[(a−m1e,t)i −mie,t]) (30)
where e stands for one’s employment status. Due to the law of large numbers, the
aggregate employment rate is set to be 0.93 based on Winberry (2018)’s calibration. Hence,
the probability density function of households over assets is obtained as the weighted
average of the probability densities depending on the employment status. Then we sample
the micro data of 1000 observations for each period from the aformentioned cross-section
distributions using the inverse probability transform.
Log-Spline Density Estimation. Given the simulated micro data, we obtain the coefficients
from log-spline estimation for each period. Figure 2 plots the densities constructed
using the log-spline coefficients and the true densities. We can see that the log-spline
approximation works reasonably well to represent the true distribution. Currently the
log-spline estimates are obtained using 1000 observations from the cross-section, and it is
expected that the approximated density will become closer and closer to the truth as the
number of observations used goes to infinity.
Functional Vector Autoregression Model Estimation. The log-spline density estimation
generates the coefficients αˆok,t, k = 0, ...,K = 13 and the dimension is reduced to K = 11
after the compression to render αˆct . We stack the total factor productivity (TFP) series and
the coefficient vector αˆct and run Bayesian vector autoregression to study the interaction
between the aggregate and the cross-section distribution. Subsequent results about the
dynamics of the cross-sectional densities are obtained by converting αˆct back to αˆ
o
t , and
back to density of interest.
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Figure 2: Log-Spline Estimated Densities vs. True Densities
period 20 period 150
Notes: The estimated densities based on log-spline coefficients (blue) and the true densities from the simulation
based on Winberry (2018).
3.3.2 Do Distributional Dynamics Affect Aggregate Dynamics?
Historical Decomposition. We examine the contribution of aggregate shocks to the
fluctuations of TFP. We compute conditional on the posterior mean estimates (denoted by
”hats” below”) and the stacked vectors Wt = [TFPt, αˆct ] for t = 1, . . . , T. Then the historical
sequence of orthogonalized innovations:
eˆt = Σˆ−1tr (Wt − Φˆ1Wt−1) (31)
We iterate the VAR difference equation forward based on a subset of the historical
innovations which selects a subset of the elements of the eˆt vector. Figure 3 illustrates
the importance of shocks based on the historical decomposition. The actual path and
the counterfactual path without selecting the distributional shocks are very close to each
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Figure 3: Historical Decomposition of Aggregate TFP Series
Notes: Actual path (blue, solid) and counterfactual path generated by innovations to macroeconomic aggregate
only (red, dashed).
other. This means that the contribution of the distributional shocks is little compared to
aggregate shock. This result is consistent with the well-known statement that individual
heterogeneity does not play much role in Krusell-Smith economy regarding the dynamics
of aggregates. In fact, the two lines in Figure 3 should perfectly overlap given that a
distributional shock is modeled not to affect aggregate variables in the Krusell-Smith
economy. The reason why our historical decomposition shows a little bit of discrepancy is
due to the nonlinear transformation our method adopts, moving back and forth between
coefficient space and density space.
Impulse Response to a TFP Shock. Under the assumption that shocks to the asset
distribution do not affect TFP contemporaneously, the TFP innovation is identified as e1t
based on the Cholesky factorization. Figure 4 shows impulse responses to a ten-standard
deviation TFP innovation based on the posterior mean. The left panel includes the impulse
responses using our method based on log-spline coefficient estimates and the right panel
includes those based on the coefficients from equation 30 to represent the true densities.
After 10 periods since a TFP shock hit the economy, the asset distribution is shown to
89
move to the right based on our method. This pattern is qualitatively consistent with the
impulse responses using the true densities. This is also the case when we look at 20-period
ahead after the shock hit the economy. The effect of a TFP shock is shown to fade away.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis focuses on the joint dynamics on total factor productivity, real
per-capita GDP, and employment at the aggregate level and the cross-sectional distribution
of earnings. Using our functional state-space model, we examine the following three
questions: (i) Do distributional dynamics affect aggregate dynamics? (ii) What is the effect
of a technology shock on the cross-sectional distribution of earnings? (iii) What are the
dynamic responses to different types of distributional shocks? We begin with a description
of the data set and the basic parameter estimates in Section 3.4.1 and then examine the
aforementioned questions in Sections 3.4.2 to 3.4.4.
3.4.1 Data and Model Estimation
Data. We use three macroeconomic aggregates in our empirical analysis: total factor
productivity (TFP), real per-capita GDP, and the employment rate. In addition, we use
cross-sectional data on earnings. Real per-capita GDP (A939RX0Q048SBEA) is provided by
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED database and the TFP series (dtfp) is obtained
from ?. Weekly earnings (PRERNWA) are obtained from the monthly Current Population
Survey (CPS) through the website of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
Based on the CPS variable PREXPLF “Experienced Labor Force Employment” we construct
an employment indicator which is one if the individual is employed and zero otherwise.
This indicator is used to compute the aggregate employment rate.
We pre-process the cross-sectional data as follows. We drop individuals if (i) the
employment indicator is not available; and (ii) if they are coded as “employed” but the
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to a TFP Shock
With Estimated Densities (h = 10) With True Densities (h = 10)
With Estimated Densities (h = 20) With True Densities (h = 20)
Notes: The blue line is for the IRFs for h periods after a TFP shock hit the economy. The red dashed line is
for the steady state distribution. The black dotted line is for the difference between the steady state and the
shocked density.
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Figure 5: Earnings and GDP
Log Earnings and GDP Log Earnings/GDP
Notes: Left panel: average log earnings (blue, solid) and log per capita GDP (red, dashed). Right panel:
average log earnings-to-GDP ratio (blue, solid) and demeaned log labor share (red, dashed) of the nonfarm
business sector. In both panels per-capita GDP is scaled by 2/3 to account for the labor share.
weekly earnings are missing. In addition, we re-code individuals with non-zero earnings
as employed and set earnings to zero for individuals that are coded as not employed.
Weekly earnings are scaled to annual earnings by multiplying with 52. A CPS-based
unemployment rate is computed as the fraction of individuals that are coded as not
employed. By construction this is one minus the fraction of individuals with non-zero
weekly earnings, which is used to normalize the cross-sectional density of earnings. It
turns out that the CPS-based unemployment rate tracks the aggregate unemployment rate
(UNRATE from FRED) very closely. The Online Appendix contains a figure that overlays
the two series.
In the left panel of Figure 5 we plot average log nominal earnings computed from
the cross-sectional data and log nominal per-capita GDP. We scale per-capita GDP by
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a factor of 2/3 to account for the labor share.28 After this re-scaling the mean of log
earnings and log per-capita GDP have approximately the same level. However, the mean
log earnings grow more slowly than per-capita GDP. In the right panel of the Figure we
plot the average log earnings-to-GDP ratio (here per-capita GDP is again scaled by 2/3)
and the demeaned log labor share of the nonfarm business sector (obtained from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics). The drop in the log earnings-to-GDP ratio is of the same order
of magnitude as the fall in the labor share over the sample period.
In the remainder of this paper we simply standardize individual-level earnings by
(2/3) of nominal per-capita GDP. Rather than taking a logarithmic transformation of the
earnings data, we apply the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, which is given by
g(x|θ) = ln(θx + (θ
2x2 + 1)1/2)
θ
=
sinh−1(θx)
θ
, x =
Earnings
(2/3) · per-capita GDP. (32)
The function is plotted in the Online Appendix. We set θ = 1. For small values of x the
function is approximately equal to x and for large values of x it is equal to log(x) + log(2).
This transformation avoids the thorny issue of applying a log transformation to earnings
that are close to zero.
Log-Spline Density Estimation. We take the time period t to be a quarter. For each
quarter from 1989:Q2 to 2017:Q3 we estimate a cross-sectional density for the transformed
earnings-to-GDP ratio; see (32). Seven knots for the log-spline density estimation are
placed at the 0.01, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9, and 0.98 quantiles of the distribution of the pooled
(across-time periods) transformed earnings data. It is important to note that the knot
locations are identical for each period t, to ensure that the basis functions associated with
the polynomial spline are time invariant. All the time variation in the densities is captured
by the time coefficients which are estimated separately for each quarter. As mentioned
28. Nominal per-capita GDP is obtained by multiplying real per-capita GDP by the GDP deflator (GDPDEF
from FRED). The factor 2/3 is a rule-of-thumb number that happens to align the levels in the left panel.
The average labor share of the nonfarm business sector over the sample period is 0.6.
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Figure 6: Estimated Log Earnings Distributions
Transformed Earnings/GDP Earnings/GDP
Notes: Each hairline corresponds to the estimated density of earnings for a particular quarter t, where t ranges
from 1989:Q1 to 2017:Q3. Transformation is inverse hyperbolic sine transformation in (32).
above, in each period, we are normalizing the cross-sectional density by the fraction of
individuals who reported to be employed. In Figure 6 we overlay the log-spline estimates
of the cross-sectional densities. The left panel shows the density of the transformed
earnings whereas the right panel shows the densities of the original earnings-to-GDP ratio
which is obtained by a change-of-variables.
94
Functional State-Space Model Estimation. The log-spline density estimation generates
the coefficients αˆok,t, k = 0, . . . ,K = 8 and for t ranging from 1989:Q2 to 2017:Q3. After
dropping the coefficients αˆ0,t that normalize the densities, we proceed with the seasonal
adjustment and the compression described in Section 3.2.2. This leads to the coefficient
vector αˆct in (24) which turns out to be of dimension 6× 1 after the compression step.
The vector Zot in (5) is composed of TFP growth, real per-capita GDP growth, and the
unemployment rate computed from the CPS data. We set Z∗ equal to the mean of these
three series. Subsequent results about the dynamics of the cross-sectional densities are
obtained by converting α˜ct vectors back into αˆ
o
t vectors as described in Section 3.2.5. We
re-normalize the densities so that they integrate to the period t employment rate, and then
apply the change-of-variable formula to obtain a density for the earnings-to-GDP ratio.
The estimation of the functional state-space model is based on the prior distribution
in (28) and (29). We set ν = nw + 5, where nw is the dimension of the vector wt in the
state-transition equation (27), and let Σ = νΣˆ, where Σˆ is the OLS estimator of Σ in (27) that
obtains when the latent α˜ct in the definition of wt is replaced by the observable αˆ
c
t . The prior
for φ is centered at µ
φ
= 0. We defer the discussion of the choice of the hyperparameter λ
to Section 3.4.2 below. Our estimation sample, after computing growth rates for TFP and
GDP growth, ranges from 1989:Q2 to 2017:Q3.
Figure 7 overlays the observed αˆck,t versus the smoothed α˜
c
k,t generated as output of
the Gibbs sampler. The discrepancy is the measurement error ηck,t, which is generally
small. The observed and the smoothed series exhibit a strong comovement. For k ≥ 2
the smoothed series are less volatile than the original series. Recall that the observed
αˆck,t series are demeaned. All of the series show low frequency movements around zero
in combination with some high frequency fluctuations. The k = 5 exhibits a noticeable
upward trend whereas the other series do not. The coefficient series as well as the estimated
parameters of the functional state-transition equation are difficult to interpret, which is
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Figure 7: Observed αˆck,t versus Smoothed α˜
c
k,t
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3
k = 4 k = 5 k = 6
Notes: The red solid lines correspond to the smoothed α˜ck,t series, whereas the blue dashed lines represent the
observed series αˆck,t.
why we will examine their implications for the dynamics of the aggregate variables and
the cross-sectional earnings distribution in the remainder of this section.
3.4.2 Do Distributional Dynamics Affect Aggregate Dynamics?
Shrinking Toward Block-Diagonality. The spillovers between distributional and aggre-
gate dynamics are affected by the coefficient matrices Bczα and Bcαz in (26). In fact, if
these matrices are equal to zero then the aggregate variables do not Granger-cause the
cross-sectional income distribution and vice versa. The prior covariance matrix Pφ(λ)
allows us to vary the degree of shrinkage for the off-diagonal elements which leads to a
96
Figure 8: Log Marginal Data Density as Function of λ1 and λ2
Notes: The log MDD surface is computed after setting the measurement error covariance matrix Vαˆct in (24) to
zero. The log MDD is maximized at λˆ1 = 0.001 and λˆ2 = 404 with ln MDD(λˆ) = −627.
continuum of model specifications of varying degree of spillovers. The fit of these model
specifications can be characterized by their respective marginal data densities (MDDs)
which include a penalty for model complexity. We set λ3 = λ2 and plot the log marginal
data density as a function of λ1 and λ2 in Figure 8. To simplify the computation of the
MDD surface, we set the measurement error covariance matrix Vαˆct to zero. While this
would affect the ranking between the functional state-space model and other model classes,
given the small magnitude of the estimated measurement errors in (7), we expect the
distortion of inference about λ to be small. We define
λˆ = argminλ∈Λ ln MDD(λ),
where Λ is the grid that was used to generate Figure 8.
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Figure 9: Impulse Responses of Aggregate Variables to Aggregate Shocks
TFP Shock GDP Shock Empl. Shock
T
FP
G
D
P
Em
pl
.
Notes: IRFs for one-standard deviation aggregate shocks (orthogonalized via Cholesky factorization; see (33)).
Panels depict responses of the log level of TFP and GDP, scaled by 100, and responses of the employment rate
in percent. Solid blue responses are based on posterior mean estimates of Bczα and Bcαz; dashed red responses
are based on setting Bczα = 0 and Bcαz = 0.
Recall that the hyperparameters scale the precision of the prior. The small value of
λˆ1 = 0.001 indicates that the overall prior variance for the φ parameters is large. However,
the large value of λˆ2 = 404 implies that the fit (accounting for model complexity) improves
by shrinking the parameters in the off-diagonal blocks Bczα and Bcαz to zero. Thus, overall
the estimated spillovers are small. The empirical results in the remainder of this section
condition on the hyperparameter estimate λˆ.
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Impulse Response Comparison. To illustrate the economic significance of the estimated
off-diagonal blocks, we compare impulse response functions (IRFs) of the aggregate
variables to the aggregate shocks under two parameterizations: (i) the posterior mean
estimates of the matrices (Bzz, Bczα, Bcαz, Bcαα,Σ); (ii) the posterior mean estimates of the
matrices (Bzz, Bcαα,Σ) and zero off-diagonal blocks Bczα = 0 and Bcαz = 0. In the vector Z˜t we
order TFP growth first, GDP growth second, and the employment rate third. We use a
Cholesky factorization Σ = ΣtrΣ′tr to orthogonalize the vector of reduced-form innovations
ut:
ut = Σtret. (33)
We interpret the first element e1t as technology innovation and the elements e2t and e3t,
broadly, as shocks to GDP growth and the employment rate. Results are depicted in
Figure 9, which depicts responses of the employment rate and the log levels of TFP and
GDP to a one-standard deviation shocks. Overall, the IRFs of the estimated system and
the block-diagonal system are small. The long-run effects of TFP and GDP shocks on
TFP and GDP are slightly larger if block-diagonality is imposed on the VAR coefficients
and the peak of the employment rate responses are slightly lower. In response to an
employment rate shock, GDP increases by 25 basis points under the estimated coefficients
whereas it essentially does not respond in the block-diagonal system. Despite these small
difference, overall, the estimated dynamics are very similar to that of a block-diagonal
system, indicating that there is not strong channel that leads from aggregate shocks to
distributional responses and feeds back into aggregate dynamics.
Historical Decompositions. We now examine the contribution of aggregate shocks to
the fluctuations of TFP growth, GDP growth, and the employment rate. We do so by
computing conditional on the posterior mean estimates (denoted by “hats” below) of (φ,Σ)
and the partially unobserved states {wt}Tt=1, the historical sequence of orthogonalized
innovations:
eˆt = Σˆ−1tr (wˆt − Φˆ1wˆt−1). (34)
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Figure 10: Historical Decomposition of Aggregate Series
TFP Growth GDP Growth Unempl. Rate
Notes: Actual paths (blue, solid) and counterfactual paths generated by innovations to macroeconomic
aggregates only (red, dashed). Q-o-Q TFP and GDP growth rates are in annualized percentages. The
unemployment rate is in percent.
Then, starting from w0 = wˆ0, we iterate the VAR difference equation forward based on a
subset of the historical innovations:
w∗t = Φˆ1w∗t−1 + ΣˆtrMeeˆt, (35)
where Me is a diagonal selection matrix with zeros and ones on the diagonal that selects a
subset of the elements of the eˆt vector. The counterfactual path also reflects the effect of
the initial condition. Recall that wt = [Z˜t, α˜t]. For the aggregate series, we simply overlay
Z˜t and the counterfactual Z˜∗t .
Results for the historical decompositions are depicted in Figure 10. The actual and
counterfactual paths of TFP growth and GDP growth are very similar, meaning that the
contribution of the distributional shocks is negligible. For the unemployment rate the
discrepancy is larger. In particular, during the period 1990s, in absence of the distributional
shocks, the unemployment rate would have been larger, whereas in th early 2000s it would
have been smaller.
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3.4.3 Effects of Aggregate Shocks
Impulse Responses to a TFP Shock. Recall that in the vector wt TFP growth is ordered
first, GDP growth is second, the CPS-based unemployment is third, and the income
distribution is last. Under the assumption that shocks to GDP growth and the income
distribution do not affect measured TFP contemporaneously, the TFP growth innovation
is identified as e1t based on the Cholesky factorization in (33). Figure 11 shows impulse
responses to a three-standard deviation TFP innovation. We take a subsample of 20 draws
from the posterior distribution of the VAR parameters and compute IRFs for each of these
parameter draws. According to the left panel, in response to this shock the level of TFP
rises in between 180 and 300 basis points (the figure depicts the response of log TFP, scaled
by 100) in the log-run, whereas log per-capita GDP rises in between 150 and 300 basis
points. Some of the TFP responses exhibit a slight hump-shaped pattern whereas most of
the GDP responses are monotonic (recall, the responses are based on a functional VAR(1)
state-transition equation). We also show responses of the employment rate. Here a number
of one means that the employment rate increases by 100 basis points (or equivalently, the
unemployment falls by one percentage point).
The center panel shows the estimated steady state density of the income distribution
(obtained from the mean coefficients α¯) as well as the response of this density to the TFP
shock after h = 4 quarters. Visually, the two densities are difficult to distinguish. We also
overlay the difference between the steady state and the shocked density and then plot this
difference separately in the right panel of Figure 11. For the center and right panels, a one
on the x-axis refers to an individual whose earnings are equal to GDP per capita (adjusted
for a labor share of 2/3). Maybe surprisingly, there seems to be a shift of probability
mass in the distribution of the log earnings-to-GDP ratio to the left. Now consider a
hypothetical individual who shifts from 1.25 to 0.75 in this distribution in response to a
TFP shock. Prior to the shock, this individual’s earnings were 25% above the per-capita
GDP (adjusted for a labor share of 2/3) benchmark, whereas after the shock it dropped to
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Figure 11: Impulse Responses to a TFP Shock
TFP, GDP, Empl. Rate [%] Earnings/GDP Distr. Distr. Response
Horizons h = 0, . . . , 19 Horizon h = 4 Horizon h = 4
Notes: Responses to a 3-standard-deviations shock to TFP. The system is in steady state at h = −1 and the shock
occurs at h = 0. Each hairline corresponds to a draw from the posterior distribution. Left panel: TFP (magenta,
dotted), GDP (blue, solid) and Employment Rate (red, dashed). Center panel: steady state earnings/GDP
density (red dashed), shocked density (blue solid), and difference (black). Right panel: zoomed-in difference
between shocked and steady state density. Red dashed line is the posterior mean response.
being 25% below the benchmark. Meanwhile the level of per-capita GDP rises by about
2.4%, making the individual significantly worse off. However, dynamics of the distribution
of log earnings are mean reverting and the effect dies out fairly quickly.
To assess the overall effect of a technology shock on the earnings distribution we plot
the response of the probability mass assigned to individuals with an earnings-to-per-
capita-GDP ratio less than one in the left panel of Figure 12. This response is positive but
fairly small – less than 2% for most hairlines and around 1% on average. The positive
response is consistent with a model in which individuals are heterogeneous with respect
to their skills and during expansions more low-skilled individuals enter the labor force.
The right panel of the figure depicts the response of the Gini coefficient. Many hairlines
indicate a slight decline of the Gini coefficient (decrease in inequality) after the shock, but
the effect is quantitatively small and the posterior mean response is essentially zero.
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Figure 12: Impulse Responses to a TFP Shock – Continued
Fraction of Individuals Gini Coefficient
Earning Less than per-capita GDP [%]
Notes: Responses to a 3-standard-deviations shock to TFP. The system is in steady state at h = −1 and the
shock occurs at h = 0. Each hairline corresponds to a draw from the posterior distribution. Red dashed line is
the posterior mean response.
Historical Decomposition. We now examine what fraction of the fluctuation of the
earnings densities is due to aggregate shocks. Starting point are the sequences ˆ˜αct and α˜
c∗
t ,
where the latter is generated by (35), shutting down the distributional shocks. Using the
steps described in Section 3.2.5 we convert the compressed coefficients into densities pˆt(x)
and p∗t (x). In addition, we generate a sequence w0t by setting Me = 0 in (35). Let p0t (x) be
the sequence of densities that corresponds to α˜c0t . This sequence only captures the effect
of the initial wˆ0, but is not perturbed by et innovations. Let ∆L1(pt, qt) be the L1 distance
between the densities pt(x) and qt(x). Finally, we define our measure of the importance of
a particular group of innovations ei,t. Suppose that p∗t (x) is generated by shutting down
the innovations ei,t. Then
IMP∗t (ei) = 1−
∆L1(p
∗
t , p
0
t )
∆L1(pˆt, p
0
t )
(36)
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Figure 13: Historical Decomposition of Variation in Earnings Densities
Notes: Importance measure for aggregate innovations (red, dashed) and distributional innovations (blue, solid);
see (36).
can be viewed as a measure of the importance of the omitted innovation. If omitting the
innovation has essentially no effect on α˜∗t , then pˆ∗t (x) ≈ pˆt(x) and IMP∗t (ei) ≈ 0. If the
shock explains most of the fluctuations in α˜t, then ∆L1(pˆ
∗
t , pˆ
0
t ) is close to zero and IMP
∗
t (ei)
is approximately one. Because the mapping from the α˜ct coefficients into the L1 distances
between the three densities is nonlinear, the specific magnitudes (other than the extremes
of zero and one) are unfortunately difficult to interpret.
Results are depicted in Figure 13. We show the importance measure for the aggregate
and distributional shocks because due to the nonlinearity of the transformation the two
measures do not add up to one. The figure shows that while there are some spillovers
from the aggregate shocks to the distributional dynamics, most of the fluctuations in the
earnings distributions are driven by distributional shocks.
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3.4.4 Effects of Distributional Shocks
The identification of a distributional shock requires additional assumptions. Recall that
ut has the partitions uz,t and uαc ,t. We denote the conforming partitions of Σtr by Σtr,zz,
Σtr,zα = 0, Σtr,αz, and Σtr,α,α. Now let q = [0, qα] be a unit-length vector with partions that
conform with the partitions of Σtr. We then define the impact vector of the distributional
shock by  Σtr,zz 0
Σtr,αz Σtr,αα

 0
qα
 .
Subsequently, we consider two ways of determining the vector qa.
Maximizing the Effect on Output and TFP Growth Variance. We follow the penalty-
function approach proposed by ? and used, for instance, by ?. For each draw (φ,Σ), we
choose the qα that maximizes the contribution of the distributional shock on the average
forecast error variance of output and technology growth over the first h¯ periods after the
shock. We normalize the sign of the impulse response function so that upon impact the
cumulative difference between the shocked and steady state density up to the 0.05-quantile
(= 0.15) is positive.
Figure 14 shows responses to a three-standard-deviation distributional shock. The top
panels in Figure 14 show responses of the earnings distribution. Panels (1,1) and (1,2)
focus on the effect at impact (h = 0), whereas Panel (1,3) shows the response after one
year (h = 4). Most of the distributional response affects individuals earning less than GDP
per capita. Upon impact, the fraction of individuals earning less than 50% of GDP per
capita increases whereas the mass of individuals earning between 50% and 100% of per
capita GDP decreases. More than 50% of the impact effect has vanished after one year.
The Gini coefficient increases in response to the shock. Thus, the shock can be interpreted
as one that raises inequality. At the aggregate level, the employment rate tends to fall,
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Figure 14: Responses to a Distributional Innovation e∗t (Average of TFP/GDP growth)
Earnings/GDP Distr. Distr. Response Distr. Response
Horizon h = 0 Horizon h = 0 Horizon h = 4
Fraction Earning Gini Coefficient TFP, GDP, Empl. Rate [%]
< per-capita GDP [%] Horizons h = 0, . . . , 19 Horizons h = 0, . . . , 19
Notes: Responses to a 3-standard-deviation distributional innovation e∗t . The system is in steady state at
h = −1 and the shock occurs at h = 0. Each hairline corresponds to a draw from the posterior distribution.
Dashed lines in panels (1,2), (1,3), (2,1) and (2,2) are posterior mean responses. Panel (1,1): steady state log
earnings density (red dashed), shocked density (blue solid), and difference (black). Panels (1,2) and (1,3):
difference between shocked and steady state density. Panel (2,3): TFP (magenta, dotted), GDP (blue, solid)
and Employment Rate (red, dashed).
whereas the effect on GDP is ambiguous. Overall, there is considerable uncertainty about
the aggregate effect of the distributional shock.
Maximizing the Effect on the Gini Coefficient. Alternatively, we consider a shock that
generates a maximal increase in the Gini coefficient upon impact. The results are depicted
in Figure 15. While the average response of the Gini coefficient is short-lived, the reduction
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Figure 15: Responses to a Distributional Innovation e∗t (Maximize Gini-Coefficient)
Earnings/GDP Distr. Distr. Response Distr. Response
Horizon h = 0 Horizon h = 0 Horizon h = 4
Fraction Earning Gini Coefficient TFP, GDP, Empl. Rate [%]
< per-capita GDP [%] Horizons h = 0, . . . , 19 Horizons h = 0, . . . , 19
Notes: Responses to a 3-standard-deviation distributional innovation e∗t . The system is in steady state at
h = −1 and the shock occurs at h = 0. Each hairline corresponds to a draw from the posterior distribution.
Dashed lines in panels (1,2), (1,3), (2,1) and (2,2) are posterior mean responses. Panel (1,1): steady state log
earnings density (red dashed), shocked density (blue solid), and difference (black). Panels (1,2) and (1,3):
difference between shocked and steady state density. Panel (2,3): TFP (magenta, dotted), GDP (blue, solid)
and Employment Rate (red, dashed).
of in the fraction of earnings that are less than the labor share of per-capita GDP is fairly
persistent. The effect on the level of output is ambiguous in the short run, but appears
negative in the long run.
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
We developed a functional vector autoregressive model that stacks macroeconomic ag-
gregates and and cross-sectional distributions to provide semi-structural evidence about
the interaction of aggregate and distributional dynamics. We treated the population
distribution as unobserved and explicitly considered sampling uncertainty associated
with the cross-section data in the measurement equation. The log densities were ap-
proximated by sieves, which allows us to obtain a finite-dimensional representation in
terms of macroeconomic variables and sieve coefficients. There could be other ways to
approximate a distribution of interest such as percentiles and cumulative distribution
functions. If one wants to approximate a density well with percentiles, many of them are
needed and it is hard to write down a coherent model on the evolution of percentiles over
time. This problem also arises in case of cumulative distribution functions which requires
monotonicity condition to hold. The nice property of using the sieves of log densities is
that we can model their evolution with a linear law of motion. All we need to worry about
boils down to normalization, which is quite straight-forward.
We studied the performance of our model with the simulated data from the Krusell-
Smith economy. Historical decomposition and impulse response functions render the
well-known results that heterogeneity in households’ assets contributes little to aggregate
dynamics. Then we moved on to applied our model to real-world data. We examined the
effect of a technology shock on the earnings distribution and the effect of a shock that
moves the earnings distribution on macroeconomic aggregates. The technique developed in
this paper should be useful more broadly for the evaluation of heterogeneous agent macro
models. Furthermore, this method will be applicable to study a wide array of empirical
hypotheses including distributional effect of a monetary policy shock and size-dependent
reaction of firms to a trade shock.
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Appendices
Appendix A on Chapter 1
A.1. Variable construction
(1) Year 1995
I use the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) available on the Federal Reserve’s
website. I drop the observations if the age of the head is less than 25 and more than 65.
Since its redesign in 1983, the SCF consists of two samples. The first sample is drawn
using area probability sampling of the entire U.S. population based on Census information.
The second sample is drawn based on tax information used to identify households at the
top of the wealth distribution. This two-frame sampling scheme yields a representative
coverage of the entire population, including wealthy households. To get rid of the outliers,
I drop the observations with total asset level greater than 95% percentile. The following
shows how each variable is constructed using the SCF data.
- checking account = X3506 + X3510 + X3514 + X3518 + X3522 + X3526
- savings account = X3804 + X3807 + X3810 + X3813 + X3816
- mutual funds = X3824 + X3826 + X3828 + X3822 + X3830
- stocks = X3915 + X7641
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- bonds = X3902 + X3906 + X3908 + X3910 + X7633 + X7634
- life insurance = X4006
- IRA = X3610 + X3620
- certificate of deposit = X3721
- value of housing = X513 + X526 + X604 + X614 + X623 + X716 + X1706 + X1806 + X1906
- mortgages and HELOCs = X1715 + X1815 + X1915 + X805 + X905 + X1005 + X1044 + X1108 +
X1119 + X1130 + X1136
- net value of housing = value of housing - mortgages and HELOCs
- total asset = checking account + savings account + mutual funds + stocks + bonds +
life insurance + IRA + certificate of deposit + net value of housing
- homeownership dummy = 1 if value of housing > 0
- housing asset share =

net value of housing/total asset if total asset > 0
0 if total asset = 0
The variables for the years 2007, 2010, 2013 are all constructed in an analogous manner,
hence an explanation is omitted.
(2) Year 1970
(2-1) Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF)
I use the 1970 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) that was conducted by the Economic
Behavior Program of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. The raw
data can be downloaded from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
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Research (ICPSR), at the Institute for Social Research in Ann Arbor. The historical survey
contains the variables that are used to construct housing asset share and home ownership
rate. It also includes demographic information including age, sex, marital status, and
educational attainment. The historical SCF sample before 1983 is not supplemented by
the second sample, so wealthy households are likely to be under-represented. Similar to
the re-weighting procedure described in Kuhn et al. (2017), I identify the observations
belonging to the top 5% of the total asset distribution. Then I increase the survey weights
for these households so that 2% of wealthy households are added to the original sample.
The remaining weights are adjusted. Once this is done, I drop the observations with a
total asset level greater than 95% percentile under the new weights. The following shows
how each variable is constructed with this data.
- checking account = V334
- savings account = V333
- mutual funds = V335
- stocks = V336
- bonds = V337 + V338
- life insurance = V275
- certificate of deposit = V332
- net value of housing = V150 + V339 - V340
- total asset29, homeownership dummy, housing asset share are analogously defined
as with the 1995 SCF.
29. There is no IRA variable for 1970. Traditional IRA was introduced with the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) and made popular with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.
111
(2-2) Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data is the longitudinal household survey.
The 1970 PSID data does not provide a detailed breakdown of households’ portfolios into
different assets. However, the net value of housing can be constructed as V1122-V1124 and a
homeownership dummy can be set to 1 if V1122> 0. Non-housing asset is required in order
to construct housing asset share variable. To do so, I use the cross-imputation strategy as
described in section 2.1.2. Table 1 shows the summary statistics from the data sets in 1970
and 1995.
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Panel A. Mean of Variables (1970 v. 1995)
Year 1970 Year 1995
Variables PSID SCF SCF
Marriage rate 0.75 0.78 0.55
Age of head 43.82 43.88 42.61
Age of spouse 39.9 40.36 40.64
Education of head 4.26 4.24 4.41
Housing asset share 0.54∗ 0.54 0.49
Homeownership rate 0.67 0.66 0.66
Employment rate (head:M) 0.94 0.9 0.84
Employment rate (head:S) 0.69 0.67 0.72
Employment rate (spouse:M) 0.52 0.51 0.66
Weekly hours worked (head:M) 43.31 43.67 40
Weekly hours worked (head:S) 27.89 29.44 32.13
Weekly hours worked (spouse:M) 17.68 8.47 25.69
Number of observations 3267 1764 2408
Panel B. Moments of housing asset share (imputed v. raw)
Housing asset share (Year 1970) PSID SCF
Mean 0.54∗ 0.54
Median 0.73∗ 0.71
Standard Deviation 0.44∗ 0.41
Table 1: Summary Statistics (1970 vs. 1995)
Notes: M stands for married and S stands for single. Education of head is a categorical variable (1:
0-5 grades, 2: 6-8 grades, 3: 9-11 grades, 4: 12 grade/ complete high school, 5: complete college,
6: post graduate studies). The value with asterisk(∗) is obtained from cross-imputation similar to
Blundell et al. (2005).
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A.2. Posterior draws
Figure 16: Histogram of Posterior Draws
Figure 17: Cumulative Mean of Posterior Draws
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Appendix B on Chapter 2
B.1. State-Space Model
(1) Measurement Error Covariance Matrix
We construct the measurement error covariance matrix from the Hessian of the log-
likelihood function for the cross-sectional observations. Let ζk(x) be the basis functions for
the log spline approximation of the cross-sectional density pt(x) and let Xot = {xo1t, . . . , xoNt}.
The density of the observations Xot in period t can be expressed as
L(αt|Xot ) = p(K)(Xot |αt) = exp
{
ζ¯(Xot )αt
}
, (37)
subject to the restriction that the density normalizes to one:
α0,t =
∫
exp
{
K
∑
k=1
αk,tζk(x)
}
dx. (38)
Imposing this restriction, the log likelihood function becomes
L(αt|Xot ) =
K
∑
k=1
αk,t ζ¯k(Xot )− N ln
∫
exp
{
K
∑
k=1
αk,tζk(x)
}
dx. (39)
The first-order derivatives with respect to αk for k = 1, . . . ,K are given by
L(1)k (αt|Xot ) = ζ¯k(Xot )− N
∫
ζk(x) exp
{
∑Kk=1 αk,tζk(x)
}
dx∫
exp
{
∑Kk=1 αk,tζk(x)
}
dx
(40)
The second-order derivatives are given by
L(2)kl (αt|Xot ) = −N
A
B
, (41)
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where
A =
[∫
ζk(x)ζl(x) exp
{
K
∑
k=1
αk,tζk(x)
}
dx
] [∫
exp
{
K
∑
k=1
αk,tζk(x)
}
dx
]
−
[∫
ζk(x) exp
{
K
∑
k=1
αk,tζk(x)
}
dx
] [∫
ζl(x) exp
{
K
∑
k=1
αk,tζk(x)
}
dx
]
B =
[∫
exp
{
K
∑
k=1
αk,tζk(x)
}
dx
]2
.
Using the constraint on α0,t in (38), we can simplify the expressions to
A =
[∫
ζk(x)ζl(x) exp
{
K
∑
k=1
αk,tζk(x)
}
dx
]
exp{−a0}
−
[∫
ζk(x) exp
{
K
∑
k=1
αk,tζk(x)
}
dx
] [∫
ζl(x) exp
{
K
∑
k=1
αk,tζk(x)
}
dx
]
B = exp{−2a0,t}.
We can therefore write the K× K Hessian as
H(αt) = [L(2)kl (αt|Xot )] (42)
with elements
L(2)kl (αt|Xot )
= −N
(∫
ζk(x)ζl(x)p(K)(x|αt)dx−
∫
ζk(x)p(K)(x|αt)dx
∫
ζl(x)p(K)(x|αt)dx
)
= −N
∫ (
ζk(x)−
∫
ζk(x)p(K)(x|αt)dx
)(
ζl(x)−
∫
ζl(x)p(K)(x|αt)dx
)
p(K)(x|αt)dx.
and
p(K)(x|αt) = exp
{
ζ(x)αt
}
.
The Hessian can be evaluated at αt = αˆrt .
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We subsequently make two adjustments to the coefficients. First, we remove a (sea-
sonal) mean α¯t = ∑4q=1 sq(t)α¯q,k. Second, we compress the coefficients to eliminate perfect
collinearities:
(αˆrt − α¯t) = Λαˆot ,
which implies that
αˆot = (Λ
′Λ)−1Λ′(αˆrt − α¯t).
Thus, we define
Vαˆot = −(ΛˆΛˆ′)−1Λˆ[H(αˆrt)]−1Λˆ′(ΛˆΛˆ′)−1. (43)
B.2. Shock Identification
Here we provide additional details on how to identify a shock that maximizes the contribu-
tion to the variance of variable i at horizons h = 1, . . . , h¯. Define the matrix M = [0nz×nαc , Inz ]
and the vector ei that has a one in position i and zeros elsewhere such that we can write
wi,t+h −E[wi,t+h] = . . . + e′i
h−1
∑
j=0
Φj1ΣtrMqα + . . . .
We can now define q∗α as the impact effect of the shock that maximizes the forecast error
variance over horizons h = 1, . . . , h¯:
q∗α = argmax e′i
[
h¯
∑
h=1
h−1
∑
j=0
Φj1ΣtrMqαq
′
αM
′Σ′tr(Φ
j
1)
′
]
ei. (44)
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Using the facts that x′A′x = tr[xx′A] and tr[AB] = tr[BA], we can rewrite the objective
function as
e′i
[
h¯
∑
h=1
h−1
∑
j=0
Φj1ΣtrMqαq
′
αM
′Σ′trΦ
j′
1
]
ei (45)
=
h¯
∑
h=1
h−1
∑
j=0
tr
[
(eie′i)(Φ
j
1ΣtrM)(qαq
′
α)(M
′Σ′trΦ
j′
1 )
]
=
h¯
∑
h=1
h−1
∑
j=0
tr
[
(qαq′α)(M′Σ′trΦ
j′
1 )(eie
′
i)(Φ
j
1ΣtrM)
]
= q′α
[
h¯
∑
h=1
h−1
∑
j=0
(M′Σ′trΦ
j′
1 )(eie
′
i)(Φ
j
1ΣtrM)
]
qα
= q′αSqα.
The optimization problem can therefore be expressed as Lagrangian
L = q′αSqα − λ(q′αqα − 1), (46)
which leads to the first-order condition
Sqα = λqα. (47)
At the first-order condition, we obtain that L = λ. Thus, the solution is obtained by finding
the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue of the matrix S.
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B.3. Supplemental Information About the Empirical Analysis
(1) Data Construction
The observations on real per capita GDP, GDP deflator, and the unemployment rate are
downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED database:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/.
The TFP series is available from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco:
https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/indicators-data/total-factor-productivity-tfp/.
The labor share series is available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, labor productivity
and cost measures: https://www.bls.gov/lpc/.
The CPS raw data are downloaded from
http://www.nber.org/data/cps basic.html.
The raw data files are converted into STATA using the do-files available at:
http://www.nber.org/data/cps basic progs.html.
We use the series PREXPLF (“Experienced Labor Force Employment”), which is the same
as in the raw data, and the series PRERNWA (“Weekly Earnings”), which is constructed as
PEHRUSL1 (“Hours Per Week at One’s Main Job”) times PRHERNAL (“Hourly Earnings”)
for hourly workers, and given by PRWERNAL for weekly workers. STATA dictionary files
are available at:
http://www.nber.org/data/progs/cps-basic/
(2) Data Transformations
The left panel of Figure 18 compares the aggregate unemployment rate to the unemploy-
ment rate computed from the CPS data. The levels of the two series are very similar, but
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Figure 18: CPS Unemployment and Earnings Transformation
Unemployment Rates Income Transformation
Notes: Left panel: CPS unemployment rate (blue, solid) and aggregate unemployment rate (red, dased).
Right panel: inverse hyperbolic sine transformation (blue, solid) for θ = 1 given in Eq. (48), logarithmic
transformation (red, dashed), and 45-degree line (orange, dotted).
the CPS unemployment rate exhibits additional high-frequency flucutations, possibly due
to seasonals that have been removed from the aggregate unemployment rate.
We transform the earnings-GDP ratio using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation,
which is given by
g(x|θ) = ln(θx + (θ
2x2 + 1)1/2)
θ
=
sinh−1(θx)
θ
. (48)
The transformation is plotted in the right panel of Figure 18 for θ = 1. Note that g(0|θ) = 0
and g(1)(0|θ) = 1, that is, for small values of x the transformation is approximately linear.
For large values of x the transformation is logarithmic:
g(x|θ) ≈ 1
θ
ln(2θx) = ln 2 +
1
θ
ln(x).
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B.4. Outline of Theory
The data generating process is given by (3), (4), (5), we we reproduce for convenience
ln Zot = ln Z∗ + Z˜t
xoit ∼ iid pt(x) =
exp{`∗(x) + ˜`t(x)}∫
exp{`∗(x) + ˜`t(x)}dx
, i = 1, . . . , N, t = 1, . . . , T
Z˜t = BzzZ˜t−1 +Bzl[˜`t−1] + uz,t
˜`t(x) = Blz(x)Z˜t−1 +Bll[˜`t−1](x) + ul,t(x)
The first part of our theory focuses on the analysis of a least squares estimator that is
generated as follows:
1. Compute period-by-period ML estimates αˆot ; see (11).
2. Let αˆ∗ = 1T ∑
T
t=1 αˆ
o
t and α˜t = αˆ
o
t − αˆ∗.
3. Let l̂n Z∗ = 1T ∑
T
t=1 ln Zot and Z˜t = ln Z
o
t − l̂n Z∗.
4. Use OLS to estimate
 Z˜t
α˜t
 =
 Bzz Bzl
Blz Bll

 Z˜t−1
Cαα˜t−1
 +
 uz,t
uα,t
 , Cα = ∫ ξ ′(x˜)ζ(x˜)dx˜.
Step 1: Control “biases” from finite-dimensional approximations. Given K:
• Assuming that N −→ ∞, derive pseudo-true ¯`(K)t .
• Given ¯`(K)t and assuming T −→ ∞, derive pseudo-true B¯(K)ll (x, x˜), etc., based on the
definition of the OLS estimator.
Step 2: Control “variances” that result from replacing:
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• pseudo-true ¯`(K)t by an estimate ˆ`(K)t (sample size N);
• B¯(K)ll (x, x˜), etc., by estimates Bˆ(K)ll (x, x˜), etc., based on ˆ`(K)t (sample size T);
Step 3: Under suitable regularity conditions for DGP, derive bounds on “bias” and
“variance” to obtain rates for the consistency of coefficients, forecasts, IRFs as (K, N, T) −→
∞.
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